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Some disagreements evoke philosophical angst: the judgment that the truth of some thesis 
is essential for the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, combined with the worry that it might 
be false. Chapter 1 develops an account of this attitude, its phenomenology, and its normative 
status in contrast to related attitudes. Philosophical angst illuminates what is at stake in debates 
ranging from the metaphysics of reasons to the relationship between God and meaning. 
Chapter 2 defends the motivation and coherence of the project. I give a general argument 
for expecting that there are significant evaluative differences in the implications of competing 
metaethical theories: radically different accounts of important domains probably differ in 
evaluative upshot. I then respond to three puzzles for making evaluative judgments about 
metaethics. 
Chapter 3 defends pro-realism, the view that it is much better if moral realism is true 
rather than any of its rivals. First, moral realism vindicates the dignified moral status described 
by the best normative moral theories, and so it is much better if realism rather than nihilism is 
true. Second, moral realism secures a desirable independence for moral justification that is 




Chapter 4 rebuts arguments that it is better if antirealism is true. First, there are reasons 
for thinking that morality itself would be worse if realism were true. Second, there are moral 
reasons for thinking we shouldn’t endorse realism. I argue that such arguments either rely on 
implausible grounding principles or they overgeneralize to all metaethical projects. 
 
Although I have raised questions of angst and value, one might think that this is 
irrelevant to truth. Chapter 5 shows that this reasonable impulse is mistaken. Inferences from It 
is better if p to It is the case that p are appropriate in contexts of inquiry in which theorists are 
responsible for accommodating not only the non-evaluative features of some domain, but the 
evaluative features as well. Metaethics is one such context. 
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Chapter 1: Philosophical Angst 
 
 
This chapter is about a particular way in which philosophical claims sometimes matter. Under 
the right conditions, such a claim can be the appropriate object of a distinctive concern, what I 
call philosophical angst. Through a series of examples and comparisons to ordinary phenomena 
like grief, I show that the concept captures something both familiar and important that is also 
uniquely philosophical. Achieving a better understanding of philosophical angst helps us to see 
why philosophy itself matters, and it highlights underexplored contours of otherwise 
longstanding debates. 
§1  Philosophical angst: its nature 
Angsty philosophers work on topics as diverse as the existence of God, the immortality of 
the soul1, the freedom of the will, the nature of the mind2, and even the metaphysics of modality.3 
In each of these domains, philosophers disagree about what is true, but they sometimes also 
disagree about the evaluative significance of competing possibilities––that is, whether and why it 
matters what is true. Such concerns are not, of course, limited to professional philosophers. We 
																																																								
1 Eli Hirsch (2009, 2, 20) says that both death and radical deception are “ineffably horrible” and “undermine 
everything that I have ever cared about in my life.” 
 
2 Jerry Fodor (1989, 77) says, winsomely, that “if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my 
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my 
saying…. If none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it’s the end 
of the world.” Thanks to Matthew Kotzen for this reference. 
 
3 Robert Adams (1979) argues that modal realism would lead to total “moral indifference.” 
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often know philosophical angst when we see and feel it, but the questions of its nature and 
appropriateness have not received sustained attention. At the very least, I want to understand 
and show how angst can be appropriate and rationally intelligible for a person, but I will also 
explore whether a case can ever be made that it is incumbent upon everyone to be angsty. It is 
one thing to show that the angsty among us have intelligible attitudes, but quite another to show 
that the angst-free are somehow deficient. 
What do I mean by “philosophical angst”? The word “angst” is familiar both as a term of 
art in existentialist or continental philosophy (where it sometimes goes by “anxiety” or “dread”) 
and as a descriptor for some related feelings stereotypically attributed to young adults. Some 
general remarks and examples will help to clarify the particular phenomenon that I have in mind. 
In a well-known parable from The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche offers what I regard 
as a paradigmatic example of philosophical angst.4 In the parable, “many of those who did not 
believe in God were standing around together” in a marketplace.5 A “madman” runs through the 
crowd screaming, astonished that no one shares his dread toward the prospect of atheism. They 
(and here the madman includes himself) have “killed” God; they have abandoned any apparent 
belief in and commitment to God or the idea of God.6 Despite taking on atheism as a philosophy, 
they have not fully appreciated what things are really like if atheism is true. The madman’s 
problem with the crowd is not that they are atheists per se. His problem is that they do not 
appreciate the implications of their atheism. In a hopeless effort to jolt them out of apathy, the 
																																																								
4 Nietzsche (2001, 119-120). 
 
5 Ibid., 119. 
 
6 See Nietzsche’s own interpretation in ibid., “The greatest recent event – that ‘God is dead’; that the belief in the 
Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its first shadow over Europe” (343). 
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madman bombastically berates the crowd. He declares that the “holiest and the mightiest thing 
the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives.”7 Existing without God is like 
“drink[ing] up the sea,” or straying “as though through an infinite nothing,” and there is no 
obvious way for us to “console” or “clean” ourselves in light of this calamitous fact. 
The madman seems to think that it is horrible (or, at the very least, colossally unsettling) 
that God does not exist, and further that someone attuned to this fact should be disturbed by the 
prospect of atheism. He asks rhetorical questions about the seemingly Sisyphean task of replacing 
God––for example, “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?”––and 
these illustrate what I take to be the core cognitive judgment constitutive of philosophical angst: 
It is very important that a philosophical claim be true, because there is no existentially adequate 
replacement for what the claim posits. What I mean by “existential” in this context has nothing 
to do with quantification. Rather, something is existentially important when it is important to the 
overall meaning and intelligibility of our lives. So, to be philosophically angsty is to think that 
what some philosophical claim posits––most richly, the way that some philosophical perspective 
pictures the world––is irreplaceable with respect to its contribution to the meaning or 
intelligibility of our lives, but that it is or might be false. Notice that, like Nietzsche’s madman, 
one need not believe the claim or perspective in question. One must simply regard its falsity 
(whether actual or merely possible) with horror. 
Irreplaceability, or more specifically what I will call “existential irreplaceability,” is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for philosophical angst. To illustrate, consider 
contemporary debates about the existence and value of God. Some philosophers, for example, 
Mark Johnston, Ronald Dworkin, and other religious naturalists, think that God’s existence 
																																																								
7 Ibid., 120. 
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would play an existentially significant role in human life, but that we have adequate replacements; 
in the case of Johnston, the replacements are humanity’s highest ideals; in the case of Dworkin, 
the replacement is the cosmos writ large as an object of the traditionally religious attitudes.8 In 
order to be properly angsty about the non-existence of God, one must not only think that God’s 
existence would satisfy deep human needs (Johnston and Dworkin agree that it would), but that 
only God’s existence could do so (here, they demur). If humanity’s highest ideals do just as well 
(or well enough), then someone who recognizes this fact cannot be intelligibly angsty about the 
falsity of theism. 
Likewise, the fact that something plays an existentially significant role does not mean that 
it or the role it plays is important in a sense that entails its being good; for this reason, mere 
existential irreplaceability is not a sufficient condition for philosophical angst. Perhaps, as 
Nietzsche himself ultimately thinks, the role that God has played in human life and thought is, in 
the end, bad or ignoble in some way. Accordingly, someone who thinks that God uniquely plays 
an existentially significant role in human life may not yet be angsty about the falsity of theism. 
They must also think that God plays an important positive role, and that it is bad if nothing plays 
that role. Call this more value-laden sense of irreplaceability, “existentially important 
irreplaceability.” 
A complex judgment of existentially important irreplaceability, though necessary, is still 
not a sufficient condition for philosophical angst. Such a judgment, as so far described, involves 
two cognitive components. First, one judges that something plays an irreplaceable (not just 
significant) role in human life. Second, one judges that what is irreplaceable is also very 
important in a positive sense. But nothing has been said so far about the phenomenology 
																																																								
8 Johnston (2009); Dworkin (2013). 
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naturally attendant to these judgments. For all I have said, someone could make a judgment of 
existentially important irreplaceability and simply move on with their lives.9 While it is tempting 
to suggest a necessary link between judgments of existentially important irreplaceability and felt 
anxiety, the temptation should be resisted. Felt anxiety is only appropriate when a third 
condition is met: one comes to think that what is existentially important and irreplaceable either 
does not or might not exist. Here, there may indeed be a necessary normative linkage––those 
who judge that something existentially important and irreplaceable does not or might not exist 
plausibly ought to in turn feel anxiety, or are at least rationally licensed to do so. 
It is worth independently emphasizing that, like a judgment of existentially important 
irreplaceability, felt anxiety itself is not a sufficient condition for philosophical angst. Someone 
might feel anxiety toward the potential loss or absence of something that they do not judge to 
have existentially important irreplaceability. For example, an otherwise angsty atheist may 
believe that there are naturalistic ways to satisfy religious desires and sentiments, but stubbornly 
or otherwise refuse to pursue them––wallowing in the absence of God despite the fact that, by 
their own lights, the wallowing lacks cognitive justification. I do not commit here to thinking that 
such a person is being irrational or unintelligible. For now, I merely stipulate that they lack 
philosophical angst. 
In sum, philosophical angst has both distinctly cognitive and conative components. The 
cognitive component is a complex judgment of existential irreplaceability about something 
important that one thinks does not or might not exist––whether it is God, moral truth, freedom, 
																																																								
9 As Susan Wolf (2010, 29 n.14) commends in her work on meaning: “Many people are upset by the thought that 
they are mere specks in a vast universe. They are upset, that is, by their smallness, their inability to make a big and 
lasting splash. My remarks––aimed at reminding them of the quality, not the quantity, of their contribution to the 




or anything else. The conative component is a kind of anxiety that is naturally attendant to or 
licensed by this judgment. Putting all of this together, then, to be philosophically angsty is both to 
judge that something is existentially important and irreplaceable, and to worry about its non-
existence. 
§2 Philosophical angst: its normative status 
Now that my account of philosophical angst is on the table, we can ask the following 
normative questions. Under what conditions is philosophical angst intelligible? And is it ever 
rationally or otherwise obligatory? Here is an easy answer: to the extent that someone sees, or is 
in a position to see, that something is both existentially important and irreplaceable, then it is 
appropriate for that person to regard its possible or actual non-existence with philosophical 
angst. This answer is much too easy. For one thing, it overgeneralizes. There are plenty of cases 
where something’s existentially important irreplaceability is relativized to certain individuals or 
groups, as well as cases where it seems appropriate to move beyond one’s angst after some finite 
period of time––for example, in cases of grief, discussed below. In such cases, a person might see 
that something is both existentially important and irreplaceable, but be outside of the group (or 
timeframe) in which philosophical angst is appropriate. Yet, what makes philosophical angst 
distinctly philosophical is not just that its object is stereotypically so, but that its normative 
purport is universal. So, while we need the account to preclude false positives, we also need it to 
yield the result that cases of appropriate philosophical angst purport to bear, in some sense, on 
everyone who is properly attuned to the relevant details. A series of examples, drawn from both 
existing literature and imagination, illustrates the need for some additional taxonomy that 
militates against the simple answer. My methodology is to use overlapping but distinct 
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phenomena to better circumscribe the nature, and especially the normative status of, 
philosophical angst. 
§2.1 Grief 
Grief over the death of a loved one bears some salient similarities to philosophical angst. 
In paradigmatic experiences of grief, one judges that the contribution that the lost person makes 
to one’s life is good, that the person is irreplaceable, and even if one does not feel anxiety per se, 
the loss is accompanied by a characteristic conative component––a kind of sorrow, perhaps 
attendant to felt emptiness. Such felt emptiness may resemble much more general feelings that 
the world is without value, or that there is no point in living. I doubt that there is a single 
phenomenology of grief; in any case, the preceding one-sentence gloss is hardly adequate. 
Indeed, how grief is experienced and expressed in practices of mourning likely varies between 
both individuals and cultures.10 But what I want to focus on here is grief’s normative status. 
The appropriateness of grief is relative in the sense that it depends in part on the 
relationship that the bereaved bears to the one who is lost. When a child’s beloved parent dies, 
for example, the child’s grief is appropriate in a way that a stranger’s grief would not be. Though 
it may be appropriate for a stranger to feel and express sympathy and sorrow upon hearing of the 
parent’s death (and the child’s loss), it is not typically appropriate for the stranger to grieve the 
death. There are many possible explanations for this asymmetry, but the one that I consider here 
is that, for the stranger, the one who is lost did not play a particular and important role in their 
life, and certainly did not irreplaceably play such a role. Strangers, qua strangers, are unimportant 
and replaceable in ways that beloved parents are not. (I do not, of course, mean that they are 
																																																								
10 See, for example, Amy Olberding (1997). 
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unimportant and replaceable full stop, morally speaking.) The upshot is that the particularity of 
the deceased is inextricably linked to who and what they were to those who grieve. 
The terrain of special relationships vis-à-vis grief is vast and complex: we may grieve the 
loss of neighbors, lovers, teammates, idols, friends, teachers, rivals, children, leaders, and myriad 
others; grief may exhibit an idiosyncratic felt character in each case. But no matter the felt 
character, the appropriateness of grief is relationship-dependent. It is not only not appropriate 
for me to grieve a stranger’s child in the way that I would grieve my own, it is positively 
inappropriate. And except in extraordinary cases (if any), it is positively inappropriate for a 
parent not to grieve their own child. 
So, grief is an attitude constituted by judgments of the loss of something important and 
irreplaceable, with an attendant negative felt character, but is such that its causes do not make it 
incumbent upon everyone. Indeed, it is not only not incumbent upon everyone to have it, but it 
is incumbent upon everyone not to have it unless they exist in the right kind of relationship. 
Grief over personal loss is not an instance of philosophical angst, first and foremost 
because (with the very interesting exception of a personalistic theism to which I return, below) 
the loss of a person is not sufficiently general in character. The kind of loss in question is itself 
qualitatively different. One loses a person who really lived, but one does not lose (or worry about 
the absence of) the truth of a philosophical claim in this way. 11 The loss that motivates 
philosophical angst is closer to the loss of a belief or, more richly, the loss of a world picture. It is 
not as if some angst-inducing thing or idea goes from true to false or vice versa, in the way that a 
																																																								
11 Recall that I am discussing grief over the death of a loved one. There is an experience recognizable as a form of 
grief involved in coming to realize that a close relationship has come to an end (as when a friendship or marriage 
comes to an end), or that an apparent relationship was an illusion (as when one discovers longstanding and 
unrepentant betrayal by one’s spouse). I regard these kinds of grief as derivative or metaphorically extended from the 
core notion of grief in response to death. 
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person moves from life to death. Rather, one either moves from thinking that something is true, 
to doubting its truth, or (in perhaps the most angst-ridden state) to thinking that it is false. 
The characteristic generality of philosophical attitudes yields a second difference between 
grief and paradigmatic instances of philosophical angst, namely that grief is relationship-
dependent in a way that philosophical angst is not. While appropriate grief does respond to 
something objectively bad (the death of a person), the response is licensed only in certain 
relational (what we might call “subjective”) contexts. 
Despite not being a form of philosophical angst, grief nevertheless illuminates an 
interesting possibility with respect to philosophical angst. There is a kind of attachment 
constitutive of many losses that appropriately lead to grief that arguably has analogues in the 
philosophical case. Monique Wonderly offers the best account of this phenomenon, what she 
calls “security-based attachment.” According to Wonderly, we are attached in this way when the 
object of our attachment is some “non-substitutable particular” that we experience as a “felt 
need,” such that its presence is a necessary and sufficient condition for a certain feeling of safety 
or at-home-ness in the world.12 Wonderly’s account is tailored to losses that are less general than 
putative philosophical truths. Indeed, it is awkward to describe a philosophical object, or what 
some philosophical claim posits (for example, moral value, God, or a kind of freedom), as a 
“non-substitutable particular,” albeit not wholly off the mark. If the philosophical claim posits 
something of a sui generis nature, then there is at least a sense of particularity enjoyed by the 
claim, though a sense quite different from the way in which one’s mother is a non-substitutable 
particular. (“Freedom of the will is irreplaceable” has a very different ring from “Your mother is 
irreplaceable.”) Nevertheless, the analogy between the “felt need” of a person and the felt need of 
																																																								
12 Wonderly (2016, 232). 
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some philosophical object is close. Just as one might feel lost or alienated in the world without 
one’s beloved, one might feel lost or alienated in the wake of losing a philosophical picture––in 
both cases, the bottom may drop out. 
§2.2 Inaccessible value 
Consider now a very different kind of case, drawn from philosophical fiction. In a little-
discussed example from a much-discussed paper, Frank Jackson imagines that we discover Fred, 
who “has better colour vision than anyone else on record; he makes every discrimination that 
anyone has ever made, and moreover he makes one that we cannot even begin to make.”13 
Jackson leverages this example in an argument against a metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, 
according to which “physical information” is the only sort of information that there is. But here I 
am interested in something else. 
Suppose we agree with Jackson that “we should admit that Fred can see, really see, at least 
one more colour than we can.”14 In addition to telling us purely descriptive information––for 
example, “There is an additional color” or “This object is not actually green”––Fred might make 
distinctly evaluative claims. Fred might declare, for instance, “You’re missing out on something 
extremely valuable.” The evaluative features of the new color, including how it compares to old 
colors, is as inaccessible to us as the new color itself. Nevertheless, if we share Fred’s aesthetic 
sense generally, then we may appropriately defer to Fred’s evaluative claim about the new color, 
and even hope or wish that we could see it for ourselves. In other words, we may both judge that 
we are missing something of value and regret that fact, largely on the basis of Fred’s testimony. 
																																																								
13 Jackson (1982, 128). 
 
14 Jackson (1982, 129). 
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Inaccessible value only partly overlaps the case of grief. In both cases, those of us outside 
the relevant experience can rightly judge that there is something valuable to which we lack access 
(respectively, the additional color, or the person as known via a particular relationship). 
Moreover, under normal conditions it is appropriate for us to defer regarding many of the 
descriptive and evaluative features of what we do not experience or see. It seems reasonable to 
defer to the advanced perceiver about what the additional color is like, and it seems reasonable to 
defer to the appropriate griever about what the person was like. But in the case of color, 
interpersonal relationships play no psychological or normative role. It is just Fred’s superior 
faculty of color perception that explains why he sees and appreciates what we cannot. There 
would be nothing inappropriate about us wishing to acquire an equally good faculty. On the 
other hand, it seems odd that we would wish to acquire all of the interpersonal relationships that 
make particular instances of grief appropriate. 
Although one need not be in some interpersonal relationship to judge that one is missing 
something in the case of inaccessible value, acquaintance with the relevant phenomenon, in both 
cases, is plausibly a necessary condition for fully appreciating its absence. Only someone who 
first sees the new color, or knew the person, will really be able to imagine and feel the lack or 
loss––i.e., to miss having visual experiences of that particular character, or knowing the person. 
In the case of the inaccessible value of a new color, something is objectively absent in the 
perceptual experiences of those who do not see it, but they are unable to directly and non-
deferentially appreciate that absence. In the case of grief, something is merely subjectively lacking 
in those who are not in an appropriate position to mourn, due to the absence of a particular 
relationship rather than a perceptual deficit of some kind. These latter persons are, under normal 
conditions, still able to indirectly appreciate the loss by analogy to their own past or potential 
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grief. Deficient faculties are quite different from the mere absence of a particular interpersonal 
relationship, even though both may block direct access to some evaluative phenomena. 
Philosophical angst shares with the case of color vision, but not grief, an objective purport; there 
is a positively important feature of the world that some people lack access to, but there is no 
barrier, in terms of their cognitive faculties, to their accessing it. But what the case of color vision 
itself lacks in terms of significance to life, both the objects of grief and philosophical angst have in 
abundance. 
§2.3 Lost worlds 
Consider now certain problems involving what I will call “lost worlds.” What I mean by a 
“lost world” in this context is an all-encompassing (or, at least, much-encompassing) picture of 
the world and our place in it that is now largely inaccessible to us qua participants (rather than, 
say, qua sociologists or historians). The phenomena of nostalgia for a lost world and the fear of 
losing a world are closer to philosophical angst than grief or deficient color perception. To 
circumscribe the phenomenon, consider some remarks by Bernard Williams in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, regarding what he calls “real” and “notional” confrontations. 
We should distinguish between real and notional confrontations. A real confrontation between two 
divergent outlooks occurs at a given time if there is a group of people for whom each of the outlooks is a 
real option. A notional confrontation, by contrast, occurs when some people know about two divergent 
outlooks, but at least one of those outlooks does not present a real option. The idea of a “real option” is 
largely, but not entirely, a social notion. An outlook is a real option for a group either if it already is their 
outlook or if they could go over to it; and they could go over to it if they could live inside it in their actual 
historical circumstances and retain their hold on reality, not engage in extensive self-deception, and so on. 
The extent to which they can do this depends on what features of their present social situation are assumed 
to remain constant if they go over to the other outlook (160-161). 
 
What interests me here is how we would understand someone with whom we are in merely 
notional confrontation when they make distinctively evaluative judgments in favor of their own 
way of life. Let us just take Williams’ own example of a medieval samurai. 
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Many outlooks that human beings have had are not real options for us now. The life of a Bronze Age chief 
or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no way of living them. This is not to deny that 
reflection on those value systems might inspire some thoughts relevant to modern life, but there is no way 
of taking on those outlooks. Even utopian projects among a small band of enthusiasts could not reproduce 
that life (161). 
 
Suppose we recover a manuscript from the time period during which the way of the medieval 
samurai was on the cusp of extinction. In this imagined document, a samurai intensely laments 
the loss of his way of life on the grounds that it is immensely valuable and has no adequate 
replacement in the modern world. In other words, we discover the writings of an angsty samurai. 
If Williams is right that we have very little in the way of participatory access to the way of life that 
the medieval samurai represents, then it is plausible that we are incapable of fully evaluating the 
way of the samurai in a well-informed manner, and consequently of comparing it to our own 
way of life. In fact, supposing that what precedes the extinction of the medieval samurai is 
something to which we have no direct access, there are grounds for thinking that the samurai on 
the edge of extinction (when the new world is coming into existence) is better-positioned to 
make a comparative value judgment than we are; after all, he has had a taste of both worlds. 
Even if we are moved by the thought that the samurai is in a superior epistemic position 
to us, I suspect that it is unlikely that we are actually prepared to defer to him about which way of 
life is better. At most we may endorse our way of life with a little more epistemic humility than 
we did before. Of course, seemingly contra Williams, many people take themselves to accurately 
and legitimately lament the modern world in favor of times past. But if these lamentations are 
fully intelligible, then it must be because these are cases where we do have some ability to 
appreciate what the respective past era was like. Perhaps it is possible to do this when there is 




Lost worlds have much in common with both the cases of grief and color perception. But 
what is lost or absent is neither a matter of a special relationship nor a particular cognitive 
faculty; rather, what is lost or absent can be fully appreciated––for better or worse––as valuable 
only from within the relevant point of view, or form of life. Those outside are unable to 
appreciate the loss. And unlike the cases of grief and absent color, it is exceedingly unlikely that 
those outside will simply defer to those within. (Indeed, from the point of view of someone 
outside the angsty perspective, the loss might even seem like an improvement.) 
The case of lost worlds also bears a similarity to grief that it does not bear to color. In the 
case of both lost worlds and grief, those of us on the outside may rightly judge that, from our 
point of view, there is (in a peculiar sense that may haunt us) no loss at all. A kind of relativism 
holds for both cases when it comes to the appropriateness of grieving or lamenting a lost world. 
As noted above, no such relativism exists in the case of color vision––failure to see the new color 
is simply a loss or regrettable absence for anyone who does not see it, whether they know it or 
not; there is no analogue for color perception being absent for one person who lacks it, rather 
than another.15 
§2.4 God revisited 
Finally, return to the paradigmatic philosophical case of angst, but which I noted above 
provides an exception to the contrast with grief: God. God’s non-existence may cause angst for 
any number of reasons.16 Perhaps the most popular reasons, at least in the philosophical 
																																																								
15 Like grief over lost persons, grief over lost worlds might involve something like Wonderly’s “security-based 
attachment” (see section 2.1). As with philosophical systems, I am not sure whether the world of the samurai counts 
as a “particular” in Wonderly’s sense, but the other similarities between the issues involved are unmistakable. 
 




literature, have to do with an alleged role that God plays in the reality or objectivity of moral 
value.17 
My purpose in this subsection is not to adjudicate the question of God’s relationship to 
morality, but simply to illustrate an overlooked aspect of angst about the non-existence of God, 
which connects it directly to the case of grief. To those (especially Christians, Jews, and Muslims) 
who think of God as a particular person, imagining a world without God is much closer to 
imagining a world without one’s beloved than it is to considering a more typical philosophical 
object. This similarity has little to do with morality, at least not in the direct sense owing to 
divine command theories of ethics. Consider that morality might be bunk, yet we might still 
lament the absence of those whom we love––including God. So, perhaps surprisingly, angst 
about God is separable from questions of morality, even though there are various ways of 
connecting the two domains. 
Despite this similarity to grief, angst about theism nevertheless seems to be a distinctly 
philosophical kind of angst. Why? Is it just an accident of historically contingent intellectual 
taxonomy that beliefs about God remain under the purview of academic philosophy? I think not. 
For one, God does not “die” in the way that persons do––see the comments above on the 
difference between philosophical angst and grief. More importantly, in the case of grief, there is 
no pressure for everyone to lament a person’s absence. Yet in the case of God, those who are 
angsty (who I will call “pro-theists”, following recent convention) characteristically join 
Nietzsche’s madman to make a claim on every person’s situation, effectively saying to every 
person, “You ought to grieve.” It is almost as if the death of everyone’s beloved is being 
																																																								
17 Probably the most classic statement of this appears in The Brothers Karamazov, in which it is claimed more than 
once that the non-existence of God entails that everything is lawful. 
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considered. It is both the case that what would be lost (or is already absent) is objectively good, 
and that lamentation is the objectively appropriate, universal response.  
As an example of what this sort of angst-mongering looks like, consider how Blaise 
Pascal––famous for thinking of God in personal rather than philosophical terms––rails against 
those who purport not to care about whether or not God exists. For Pascal, God’s existence is the 
only bulwark against human misery. 
This carelessness in a matter where they [people apathetic toward the existence of God] themselves, their 
eternity, their all, are at stake, irritates me more than it moves me. It astonishes and appalls me; to me it is 
monstrous. … We do not need a greatly elevated soul to understand that there is no real and solid 
satisfaction here; that all our pleasures are only vanity; that our ills are infinite; and that finally death, which 
threatens us at every moment, must in a few years infallibly place us under the horrible necessity of being 
either annihilated or wretched eternally.18 
 
There is a puzzle facing both Pascal and God’s lesser angst-mongers. In the case of theism, as 
with lost worlds and inaccessible value, those who are not angsty may suffer from radical 
epistemic inaccessibility with respect to the theistic possibility. While those who have either  lived 
in the lost world (viz., the world formed by the thought that there is a particular divine person) or 
somehow have other ways of appreciating it may find themselves unable to find any “real and 
solid satisfaction here”, the rest may find it easy to simply move on. Or, they may just continue 
living: there may be no sense of “moving on” at all. Though the angsty pro-theist might be unable 
to see her non-angsty compatriots as anything other than making a “monstrous” error in 
judgment, or missing something important about the world, there does not seem to be any 
sensible, rational way of inducing angst in those who lack it. After all, for someone who neither 
thinks that God exists nor appreciates what the theistic picture is really like, what motivation 
could there possibly be to get oneself to appropriately lament the non-existence of God? Why be 
a glutton for that kind of punishment? 
																																																								
18 Pascal (2005, S681, 217). 
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Notice that, even though the lament over the imagined “death of God” shares with grief a 
sense that a particular person has been lost or is otherwise absent, only those who can appreciate 
the world in a particular way (as containing “the beloved”) can in turn fully appreciate the quality 
that the world had or can have with that particular person. In this way, pro-theistic angst is not 
unlike all cases of grief, but it is still quite unlike paradigmatic cases. The analogue in grief for 
Nietzsche’s madman is not simply someone who is trying to convince, say, a parent to mourn the 
death of her child; it is, rather, someone who is trying to convince a parent to mourn the “death” 
of a child who, by her lights, never existed in the first place. In another way, it is like trying to 
convince someone to mourn the death of a person they never knew, or a fictional character who, 
in some strange sense, might really have existed. 
§3 Insiders and outsiders 
The above examples help to illustrate the way in which angst that is distinctly 
philosophical must have a universal purport. It offers a lament that purports to be both 
responsive to objective evaluative features of the world (say, that it regrettably lacks God) and 
appropriate for anyone who is attuned to the evaluative and other relevant facts. But those who 
want to communicate or induce angst that is distinctly philosophical face difficult 
epistemological and communicative problems, highlighted in some of the contrasts above. Those 
philosophical claims or viewpoints likely to induce angst are all- (or at least much-) 
encompassing. They contribute to how we see the world overall, as well as how we decide to live. 
These sorts of perspectives, and the value that they secure, can be difficult to appreciate from the 
outside. Even if those who know what it is like within the walls of, say, theism seem to themselves 
to just see that the world outside their windows is bleaker than the world within, this perception 
may be as inaccessible to outsiders as the alleged betterness of the samurai life is to all of us. 
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The example of the death of God, especially as it relates to grief, color perception, and lost 
worlds, suggests a further taxonomy of insiders and outsiders with respect to access to the value of 
some would-be philosophical truths. Insiders, whether they believe the thesis or not, have some 
kind of access to what it would be like both for the thesis to true and for it to be false. An insider, 
in this sense, need not actually endorse the relevant thesis, although in many cases it might be a 
necessary condition that they at one time did endorse it. This necessary condition holds if 
endorsement is itself necessary for full appreciation of the relevant phenomena, but it will not 
hold otherwise. Put in the suggestive terminology of mourning, insiders are those who are 
acquainted, at least in thought, to the one whose loss or absence is lamented. Outsiders have 
access to at most what it would be like either for the thesis to be true or for it to be false, but not 
both. For some putative object of philosophical angst, knowing what it is or would be like, 
combined with the ability to picture its non-existence, is sufficient for being an insider. 
Must outsiders be such that they never endorsed the relevant thesis? Put another way, 
does simply having been acquainted with the object of angst at one time or another, in reality or 
in mere thought, count toward being an insider? Although this is a tempting idea, it should be 
rejected. First, there may be merely nominal ways of endorsing a thesis that, due to their 
superficiality, fail to provide one access to a genuine sense of what the truth of the thesis is like, 
even though one still counts as endorsing the thesis. For example, it seems that there could be a 
nominal theist who is so unreflective and unattached to theism that she fails to gain any angsty 
attachment to God or the idea of God. Indeed, Nietzsche’s madman can be interpreted as saying 
that his interlocutors in the marketplace are examples of this very phenomenon. Second, there is 
no obvious reason why someone who once endorsed a thesis might not experience philosophical 
forgetfulness, losing a sense of what it was like to stand within a particular point of view. Such a 
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person might have undergone a “transformative experience” in the sense developed by L.A. Paul, 
whereby not only her beliefs and perceptions have changed, but also her affective and evaluative 
apparatus.19 
The epistemological upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the ability to convey 
appropriate philosophical angst to the angst-free might depend on various a-rational, contingent 
features of the non-angsty person’s history and psychology, namely the extent to which they have 
had access to, and recall, what some philosophical picture was really like from the inside. They 
must be insiders. This suggests that the only routes for convincing outsiders are, likewise, 
distinctly a-rational, for example, a form of radical conversion to a different, new perspective, or 
at least to a new vantage point, from which one can appreciate the evaluative contours of some 
philosophical contrast. 
Recall a question from the previous section about the point of angst about God. I asked: 
what motivation could there possibly be to get oneself to appropriately lament the non-existence 
of God? The question generalizes: Even if one could make another person or oneself angsty on 
any particular issue, why do so? In fact, it is even open to question what the value is in expressing 
philosophical angst at all, whether or not one is able to convert others. In answer to the question 
about the point of making others or oneself angsty, the question is really only answerable from 
the perspective of seeing the angst as warranted or possibly warranted. From the angsty or angst-
curious point of view, angst is or might be the fitting response to the world as it really is, 
including its dreadful or potentially dreadful aspects. It is plausible that there is intrinsic value in 
appreciating the world as it really is, rather than living under illusions, and so this intrinsic value 
is available as a reason to spread or acquire philosophical angst where it seems appropriate. 
																																																								
19 See L.A. Paul (2016). 
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A second valuable feature of identifying where philosophical angst is appropriate has to 
do with philosophical inquiry itself. This also speaks to the second question about the value of 
philosophical angst in the event that no one else is convinced to acquire it. Philosophical angst is 
valuable, partly because it can direct and motivate our philosophical inquiry. It amounts to an 
appreciation of what is at stake in certain philosophical debates. That some questions are more 
angst-ridden than others is not a reason to pursue only the angsty topics, but it is a reason to 
make sure to pursue those topics, or to pursue them more centrally, and to never lose sight of 
them. 
Finally, there is an important lacuna in what I have written so far. It is open to outsiders 
to think that it is they who are more in touch with evaluative reality than angst-mongering 
insiders. After all, it is possible that the world-picture that grips the insider is ultimately a 
confusion of some kind, perhaps requiring liberation via Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy. 
According to such a view, proper attunement to the evaluative and other features of the world 
results not in angst but in freedom from angst. 
In response to this point, it seems to me that there is at least some very weak reason to 
suspect that angsty insiders are in a better position vis-à-vis delusions––namely, they have some 
taste of both worlds in question. This provides some grounds for a very mild sort of deference by 
outsiders toward insiders. However, the deference warranted is so weak that it may amount to no 
more than grounds for a brief second-guessing of one’s own lack of angst. Moreover, even if 
angsty insiders are in a somewhat better epistemic position, it is still epistemically admirable that 




Ultimately, in the event that an insider and an outsider make parallel but competing 
claims about which of them is confused, it seems that a stalemate, or something very close to a 
stalemate, threatens. But this is not as worrying as it might seem to be at first, because it still 
seems valuable that the angsty and the angst-free continue to engage one another with an attitude 
of openness to the possibility that they are either missing something about the world or seeing 
something that is not really there. 
§4 Philosophical angst and contemporary philosophy 
A better understanding of philosophical angst can help to illuminate underexplored 
aspects of contemporary debates, as well as to make intelligible the underlying concerns that 
animate those debates. In this final section I give two such examples: the metaphysics of reasons 
and the meaning of life. 
§4.1 The Metaphysics of Reasons 
Within metaethics, perhaps the angsty philosopher par excellence is Derek Parfit. Parfit 
defends an externalist (in his taxonomy, “objectivist”) account of reasons, according to which the 
reasons that we have are both irreducibly normative and non-natural. What makes Parfit angsty, 
however, is not just the normative metaphysic that he happens to endorse, but the importance 
that he attributes to the truth of that metaphysic. According to Parfit, if his account of reasons is 
false, then nothing matters. 
Unsurprisingly, several philosophers––including philosophers otherwise sympathetic to 
Parfit’s metaethical program––have balked at the dramatic inference Parfit draws from the falsity 
of his view. The point here is not to consider these responses in detail, but to notice a structure 
that they share. 
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Julia Driver, Larry Temkin, and Sharon Street all agree that Parfit is onto something when 
he says that his opponents’ views would mean that nothing matters. Yet they each agree, for 
related reasons, that this fact is not as significant as Parfit thinks it is. Driver confesses that she 
shares with Parfit “the same worries that anti-realist views of morality … are at least prima facie 
disturbing,” though she does not quite say why.20 Temkin writes that “Parft may be correct that if 
his externalist non-natural view of normativity is mistaken, then nothing matters in his sense. 
And I, for one, would very much like it to be true, and would be very disappointed if Parfit’s view 
was false, so that nothing mattered in his sense.”21 Like Driver, Temkin does not explain why it 
would be so disappointing to him if Parfit’s view were false, other than to say that it would mean 
nothing matters in Parfit’s sense. Finally, Street concedes to Parfit that, on anti-realist views like 
hers, “Nothing matters, ultimately, independently of the attitudes of beings who take things to 
matter.”22 For her part, Street registers no disappointment. Despite some concessions, each one 
of these philosophers argues that Parfit ignores intermediary ways that things can matter, which 
are established by non-nihilistic alternatives to Parfit’s externalism. 
Both Driver and Street endorse versions of metaethical constructivism that deliver some 
of the features of reasons that make Parfit’s view so attractive. For example, Driver observes that 
one appealing feature of Parfit’s non-naturalism is that it secures the non-contingency of moral 
norms. But some forms of constructivism might also secure a kind of non-contingent 
universality of reasons––at least, for beings like us (namely, in Driver’s theory, beings who are 
“moral agents and evaluators”). Though Driver concedes that this sort of view does not “solve” 
																																																								
20 Driver (2017, 172). 
 
21 Temkin (2017, 27, emphasis mine). 
 
22 Street (2017, 121). 
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the contingency problem (presumably, because reasons are still contingent at the level of agent-
type), it “mitigate[es] it.”23 In other words, one feature of reasons that plausibly contributes to 
Parfit’s angst seems to come in degrees. Once we recognize this, we can see how the metaphysics 
of reasons is not a zero-sum game. Some anti-Parfitian views accommodate these features better 
than others. 
In the same spirit, although he does not name a specific view, Temkin outlines 
“intervening positions” between Parfit’s non-naturalism and normative nihilism. Each of these 
positions accommodates varying degrees of “robustness” as a property of reasons––where 
robustness is a gloss on non-contingency.24 So, although Temkin prefers that Parfit’s non-
naturalism be true, he disagrees with Parfit that we face a situation of non-naturalism or bust. 
With an account of philosophical angst in hand, we can interpret Parfitian angst in a way 
that puts some pressure on the objection from intermediate positions. According to a version of 
Parfit’s view understood in terms of philosophical angst, the non-naturalistic, purely and 
irreducibly normative nature of reasons is existentially important and irreplaceable by other 
possible natures that reasons might have. Instead of asking (with Parfit) whether Parfit’s 
interlocutors have the concept of a reason, or asking (with Parfit’s opponents) whether there are 
intermediate kinds of mattering that Parfit ignores, we can ask what it is about external reasons 
and externalist mattering, on Parfit’s conception, that is so important and irreplaceable. Parfit’s 
opponents see his angst as a response to some property that comes in degrees, whereas it is clear 
that Parfit himself thinks there is something at stake in an absolute, all-or-nothing sense. 
																																																								
23 Driver (2017, 184-85). 
 
24 Temkin (2017, 29-30). Temkin models robustness with differing font sizes in writing the word “REASONS”, 
illustrating that there are many font sizes between the large font representing Parfitian reasons and the very small 
font representing nihilism. 
 
 24 
This is a fruitful way to understand a position like Parfit’s, because it forces us to ask 
more specifically what the particular contribution is of this or that philosophical scheme to what 
matters to us in the relevant domain. In another paper, I argue that what is angst-inducing about 
non-naturalistic moral realism is that only on such a view does moral justification (and so, moral 
vindication) enjoy a kind of robust stance-independence that is qualitatively, rather than 
quantitively, different from the many degrees of independence secured by different versions of 
moral anti-realism.25 A similar route may be available to the Parfitian: perhaps only non-
naturalistic, purely and irreducibly normative reasons are sufficiently independent of our 
psychologies to get us what we (or, at least, what insiders) want (that is, what we want at an 
existential or emotional rather than a theoretical level) out of an account of reasons. 
If this interpretation of Parfitian angst is correct, then all Driver and Temkin have shown 
is that there is a kind of non-contingency that comes in degrees of distance from actual, 
individual attitudes, but which is still tethered to them. They see Parfit’s position at the most 
non-contingent end of this spectrum, and nihilism just over the edge of the least non-contingent 
end. Hence, the more plausible views we can develop in the middle, the more of a buffer we have 
against nihilism. It is an intuitive thought, to be sure. But, for Parift, the entire kind itself––the 
kind of non-contingency that comes in degrees, that is––is qualitatively different from the kind 
of non-contingency secured by his own view of reasons. 
§4.2 The Many Meanings of Life 
The topic most closely associated with philosophical angst is probably the meaning of life, 
and in particular the relationship that the meaning of life bears to the existence of God. There is a 
common thought that the existence of God is a necessary condition for the meaning of life. 
																																																								
25 See chapter 3. 
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Justifying the common thought is a lot trickier than merely expressing it. But, again, the point 
here is to show how the concept of philosophical angst might illuminate some underlying 
concerns of this debate, not how it might solve it. 
Due especially to the work of Susan Wolf, it is common to distinguish between at least 
two distinct senses of “meaning” that are sufficiently similar to provide a plausible and important 
disambiguation in the common thought.26 On the one hand, we can think of there being a kind of 
cosmic or ultimate meaning, which only God, or something like God, can secure. This is the sort 
of meaning that attracts intensification or capitalization, as in real meaning or Meaning. The 
concept of ultimate meaning is somewhat hard to articulate any further. What, after all, could 
such meaning amount to? Candidates include things such as being the result of divine action, or 
being created by someone for a purpose or plan, or having an objective purpose, or perhaps simply 
being an object of divine love. However we define the sort of meaning that only something godlike 
can provide, philosophers generally agree that it is distinguishable from a kind of meaning that 
life might have irrespective of whether God exists. This is the sort of meaning often exhibited by, 
for example, valuable personal projects like painting a picture, raising a child, climbing a 
mountain, or proving a complicated theorem in mathematics. Even in a world in which lives lack 
ultimate meaning, these activities remain more meaningful than, say, counting ants for no 
reason.27 So, it seems that there is an index of something appropriately called “meaning”, even 
																																																								
26 See Wolf (2010). 
 
27 Robert Paul Wolff conveys the following anecdote about the eminent myrmecologist E.O. Wilson: “After the usual 
greetings, he showed me the centerpiece of the office, a large table on which, under a Plexiglas dome, was a bustling, 
complex ant colony. Wilson banged the side of the table, which set the ants scurrying, and as they poured out of the 
anthill he pointed out the soldier ants, worker ants, and so forth. I didn't have much in the way of conversation. 
What can you say about an anthill, after all?  So, casting about for something to say, I mused aloud, ‘I wonder how 
many ants there are in the entire colony.”  “Fifteen thousand,” Wilson replied. “How can you be sure?” I asked.  “I 
counted them,” he said.” (Wolff, “What Have I Been Reading,” September 1, 2013, 
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though these activities do not seem to provide whatever we are talking about when we talk about 
ultimate meaning. 
This distinction between cosmic and ordinary meaning (what Wolf calls meaning of life 
and meaning in life, respectively) is sufficient for deflating (to some degree, at least) the common 
worry about the existence of God and meaning. Even if God is required for cosmic meaning, we 
may still have (ordinary) meaningful lives even if God does not exist––and that is enough. What 
else might the pro-theist say? 
The pro-theist may argue further that ultimate meaning is existentially important, rather 
than merely good or desirable; it is not, like winning the lottery, something that would be very 
good but unnecessary for a good life. Second, the pro-theist may argue that ultimate meaning is 
irreplaceable, in that the need that it satisfies is not also satisfiable by something else, even 
ordinary meaning. 
This is a fruitful way to understand the angsty concern about God and meaning, because 
it invites us to ask more specifically what the particular contribution is of this or that kind of 
meaning to our lives going well. In another paper (and in section 2.4, above), I argue that what is 
properly angst-inducing about, at least, popular forms of personalistic theism is that God is a 
particular person to whom one might stand in a meaningful relationship, akin to other personal 
relationships but with deeper and more lasting consequences.28 Hence, unlike in the case of 
metaethics, I do not think that the standard form of philosophical angst here is ultimately cogent: 
there seems to me to be no sense of cosmic meaning the angsty recognition of which is 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
http://robertpaulwolff.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-have-i-been-reading.html). My brother, who is a myrmecologist 
only slightly less eminent than Wilson, claims to have counted 20,434 ants while performing research at the Konza 
Prairie Biological Station at Kansas State University. Both myrmecologists presumably counted their ants for 
reasons, though it is open to question whether these reasons are sufficient for meaningfulness. 
 
28 For elaboration, see my “The Value and Particularity of Persons” (ms). 
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incumbent upon everyone who considers the non-existence of God, given that God is or would 
be a particular person; like grief, angst about God requires a particular relationship. But that is 
not the point here. I am arguing that those philosophers who do want to defend this kind of angst 
may fruitfully adopt the framework here on offer. Their explanatory burden is to specify, first, 
why cosmic meaning is existentially important in human life; and second, why it is irreplaceable 
by ordinary meaning with respect to this role. 
§5 Conclusion 
 This paper is as an exercise in the phenomenology of a characteristic attitude, one that I 
call “philosophical angst.” But it also provides a framework for exploring new avenues in extant 
philosophical debates. In service of the first goal, I have identified the conditions and normative 
status of philosophical angst, comparing and contrasting it with overlapping but distinct 
attitudes that are not properly philosophical. In service of the second goal, I have suggested two 
applications of the notion of philosophical angst, one in the debate about the nature of reasons, 





Chapter 2: Metaethical Value Judgments 
 
 
Suppose that moral nihilism is false. Does anything of further, evaluative importance depend on 
which non-nihilistic metaethical theory is true? This paper defends metaethical claims (including 
non-nihilistic metaethical claims) as intelligible and appropriate objects of evaluative judgments. 
I will call such a judgment a “metaethical value judgment”: an evaluative judgment about ways 
that the world might be, metaethically speaking. Such evaluative judgments are distinct from 
descriptive judgments about what some theory can or cannot accommodate. It is one thing to 
judge that a metaethical theory, say, cannot account for moral error, but quite another to judge 
that it would be worse if the theory were true (though it very well might be worse because it 
cannot account for moral error).29 Thinking about metaethical value judgments affords us a 
useful, clarifying way of thinking about what is at stake in metaethics. If some metaethical value 
judgments are cogent, then metaethics is not an evaluatively inert domain, even if the traditional 
conceptual distinction between meta- and normative ethics might suggest as much. 
 This chapter gives some general, abstract argument for thinking that there are significant 
evaluative differences between metaethical possibilities, and it responds to some reasons for 
skepticism toward the general project of making metaethical value judgments. This chapter sets 
																																																								
29 Sturgeon (1986) addresses the question of what “difference” it makes whether moral realism is true, but his 
examples involve desiderata that are non-evaluative in my sense, e.g., accommodating the possibility of moral error. 
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the stage for making a substantive case about what we should desire and hope for when it comes 
to metaethics. 
§1 Metaethics matters: some negative arguments 
The distinction between meta- and normative ethics gives us some reason to doubt the 
claim that there is something evaluatively at stake between non-nihilistic metaethical theories. 
With the exception of moral nihilism, all metaethical theories provide vindications of the moral 
domain. That is to say, each non-nihilistic metaethic, were it true, would establish how and why 
moral discourse and practice are legitimate and well-grounded. In this sense, a true, non-
nihilistic metaethic will in turn vindicate whatever the best normative moral theories happen to 
say, even though the true metaethic will not itself dictate what they say. So, if it is normative 
(including applied) ethics that makes a difference to what is evaluatively important in morality, it 
seems that there cannot be much at stake evaluatively between non-nihilistic metaethical 
theories. Sure enough, morality itself is at stake in the question of nihilism. But despite their 
many differences, non-nihilistic metaethical theories all have the same ultimate evaluative 
upshot: the vindication of normative ethics and whatever the best normative theory happens to 
say. 
Before addressing this argument head-on, it is worth acknowledging that there is, in fact, 
not a clear or non-contentious dividing line between meta- and normative moral theory. Here is 
a simple gloss on the intuitive distinction: metaethics concerns the nature and status of the moral 
domain––that is, its metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, and psychology. Normative ethics, on 
the other hand, concerns the content of the moral domain––that is, its constitutive norms. But 
there are views that seem to violate this conceptual boundary. Some versions of metaethical 
constructivism, according to which moral truths are determined or constituted by some actual or 
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hypothetical agreements among moral agents of suitably specified capacities, are hard to place in 
the traditional taxonomy, since they seem to do double-duty as meta- and normative ethical 
theories. Likewise, some metaethical theories seem especially well-fitted to particular normative 
theories––for example, the naturalistic versions of moral realism developed by Richard Boyd and 
Peter Railton seem to comport especially well with some form of normative consequentialism. 
Nevertheless, I think that the simple gloss tracks a real conceptual distinction, even if some 
extant views in moral philosophy do not obey that distinction and must have their individual 
meta- and normative components carefully parsed. 
Fortunately, there is a response to the intuitive argument against the evaluative 
significance of metaethics that does not depend on calling into question its distinction from 
normative ethics. From the fact that metaethics is not normative ethics, or that evaluative facts 
are determined only by the latter, it does not follow that metaethics is of no evaluative 
significance. Notice that theories about God or freedom of the will are not instances of normative 
ethics, yet no one doubts that competing theories in those domains have significantly different 
evaluative upshot. Of course, unlike theories of God or freedom, metaethical theories are 
explicitly vindicatory of the normative moral domain, and so the very domain of evaluative 
significance itself seems to depend on one such theory being true. But it still does not follow that 
metaethical theories have no evaluatively important differences. First, two metaethical theories 
might share their moral evaluative upshot, but differ in their non-moral evaluative upshot, which 
is not dependent on (moral) metaethics. For example, even though two metaethical theories 
equally vindicate the claims of morality, perhaps only one of them is congenial to the demands of 
prudence, or with concerns about meaning, or with aesthetic norms.  
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It can be easy to miss, but many seemingly non-evaluative objections to metaethical 
theories can be interpreted or developed in just this direction. For example, some philosophers 
object to metaethical non-naturalism and Platonism on the grounds that such theories make the 
epistemology of morality too mysterious. There are two ways to interpret this objection. As 
stated, it is often a purely descriptive sort of objection. It points to a theoretical desideratum, viz. 
accommodating moral knowledge, and says that some theories fare poorly. But there is a nearby 
evaluative version of this complaint: it would be bad if we lacked all access to moral truths, 
properties, and the like. One need not think this condition would morally bad, and certainly not 
only morally bad, in order to endorse this evaluative complaint. Such a result would, at the very 
least, be epistemically bad. 
Second, and most importantly, we should not be deceived by the intuitive theoretical 
hierarchy that moves from applied, to normative, and finally to metaethics, even if we are talking 
about the broadest version of such a hierarchy: the study of normativity in general. The fact that 
metaethics takes normative ethics as its object, theoretically speaking, does not mean that 
normative ethics cannot in turn take metaethics (and everything else) as its object, normatively 
speaking. Normative evaluation has effectively unlimited scope: everything can come under our 
normative evaluation.30 In a word, suppose that some metaethical theory vindicates the 
normative domain. This vindication will include what the normative domain says about the 
metaethical theory itself. 
																																																								
30 In my view, this is one of the lessons of G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument. According to that argument, of 
any non-moral property or thing putatively identified with goodness, we can coherently and competently ask, “Is it 
good?” Even if this argument does not accomplish everything that Moore intended, the persistence of “open 
questions” is well-explained by the thesis that normative evaluation has unlimited scope. Cf. Robert Adams’ claims 
in Finite and Infinite Goods that there is a “critical stance” intrinsic to morality that allows any natural or empirical 
fact or phenomenon to fall under the critical purview of morality (78). 
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The above considerations are negative arguments against the intuitive idea that 
metaethics does not matter evaluatively, provided that some form of non-nihilism is true. 
Although I regard these arguments as sufficient for motivating an exploration of what is 
evaluatively at stake in metaethics, the motivation would be bolstered by a positive argument for 
thinking that metaethics does matter in the relevant sense. 
§2 Metaethics matters: a positive argument 
Provided that we countenance metaethics as a genuine sub-domain of moral inquiry, we 
can consider the following argument, which I will call the “Evaluative Difference Argument”, in 
favor of the claim that there probably are evaluative differences between different metaethical 
theories. 
1. The moral domain is valuable and important. 
2. The major families of metaethical theory offer radically different descriptions of the 
moral domain. 
3. The fact that two descriptions of something valuable and important are radically 
different provides some defeasible evidence that they are not equivalent in evaluative 
upshot. 
Therefore, 
4. The fact that the major families of metaethical theory are radically different provides 
some defeasible evidence that they are not equivalent in evaluative upshot. 
 
In a sentence, the intuitive thought behind this argument is this: when there are two very 
different descriptions of something that is extremely valuable and important, it is somewhat 
likely that it makes a significant difference which description is true. Before defending the details 
of the argument, I will offer two clarifications about the premises. By “major families of 
metaethical theory” I mean those theories that are typically distinguished at the highest levels of 
abstraction, warranting, for example, different categories in philosophical encyclopedias and 
different units in introductory course syllabi. So, for example, Richard Boyd and Peter Railton, 
though their metaethical views are not identical, offer theories in the same family: naturalistic 
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moral realism. Likewise, despite their differences, Alan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn defend 
two theories in the same family: metaethical expressivism. The difference in family is what makes 
the difference in theories “radical”: theories from different families are generally incompatible at 
a fundamental, or near-fundamental level. Unlike many of their individual components, they are 
mutually exclusive. Both expressivism and naturalistic realism cannot be true, even though some 
components of expressivism (e.g., non-cognitivism about moral judgment) are compatible with 
some components of naturalistic realism (e.g., objectivism about moral truth).  
By “equivalent in evaluative upshot” I mean equivalent with respect to how good or bad it 
would be if the theory were true, and in what ways. Setting metaethics to one side for a moment, 
two incompatible theories of God are evaluatively equivalent, in my sense, if it would not matter, 
evaluatively speaking, which theory is correct. That it does not matter evaluatively which theory 
of God is correct does not mean that the debate in general does not matter: after all, it may be an 
intrinsically interesting debate, or it may be important for some contingent, instrumental reason. 
But the absence of evaluative difference does mean that the debate is, in itself, evaluatively inert. 
On the other hand, if two theories of God are not evaluatively equivalent, then there must be 
some respect in which it is correct to say that the truth of one theory would, in itself, be better 
than the other. Just as we might naturally say “It doesn’t matter which of X or Y is true” 
regarding evaluatively equivalent theories, a natural way of expressing evaluative non-
equivalence is, “It would be better if X rather than Y were true.” 
So much for the meaning of the premises. I will now give some reasons for accepting 
premises 2 and 3. For present purposes, I am just taking premise 1––that morality is valuable and 
important––as uncontroversially true. The argument is simply not aimed at those who do not 
care about morality at all, or regard it as having no importance or value. Rather, it is aimed at 
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those who care about morality, but do not think that much hangs on metaethics––provided some 
non-nihilistic theory is true. Notice that premise 1 is weaker than a nearby claim that only some 
philosophers would accept but many would deny, viz., that the moral domain is maximally 
valuable and important, or enjoys overriding value and importance. The weaker version should 
be acceptable even to philosophers who find themselves in the tradition that dethrones morality 
from its maximally authoritative perch.31 The view that moral demands do not necessarily settle 
practical matters should not be conflated with the view that moral demands are not important at 
all, or even that they should not factor heavily in practical deliberation. As far as I know, even 
philosophers who devote considerable time to dethroning morality do not reject premise 1. 
Premise 2 is more controversial than premise 1, but I do not think that it should be very 
controversial. Different families of metaethical theories ground moral discourse and practice, not 
to mention moral truth itself, in totally different phenomena. It is difficult to overstate the 
difference between, say, non-natural, irreducibly normative facts, on the one hand (in which 
robust realists ground morality), and our deepest commitments and cares, on the other (in which 
expressivists ground morality). That being said, it must be admitted that differences between the 
families of metaethical theories come in degrees: non-naturalist realism is further from naturalist 
constructivism than is naturalist realism. This point about degrees will be relevant in defending 
and better understanding premise 3. 
Premise 3––the fact that two descriptions of something valuable and important are 
radically different provides some defeasible evidence that they are not equivalent in evaluative 
upshot––is the most controversial premise in the Evaluative Difference Argument. The first 
																																																								
31 Some important works in this contemporary tradition include Bernard Williams (1985), Harry Frankfurt (2004), 
and Susan Wolf (1982). 
 
 35 
thing to emphasize is that the premise makes an evidential or probabilistic claim, not a claim of 
entailment. So, counterexamples to the stronger entailment claim would not by themselves defeat 
the probabilistic claim. How might the evidential claim be defended? By thinking about examples 
that are less taxonomically complicated than metaethics (which itself overlaps several areas of 
philosophy), I think that Premise 3 can be, at the very least, made more intuitively plausible. 
Consider, again, two radically different theories of God: the traditional, supernaturalist view that 
God is a particular person who created, governs, and loves the world, and the more 
“philosophical” view that God is the “ground of Being,” beyond and wholly separate from 
worldly categories like “person”, “creator”, and certainly “love.” It would be extremely surprising 
if the debate between these two views turned out to be evaluatively idle––that is, if there were no 
cogent reasons whatsoever to think that it would be preferable that one rather than the other 
theory were true. This surprise is well-motivated by the fact that radically different descriptions 
of something extremely significant are likely to yield different evaluative upshot. 
If the simple example of concepts of God is compelling, then the case of metaethics 
should be even more compelling. Whereas theories of God are narrowly focused on the nature of 
an important particular being or concept, metaethical theories are sprawling accounts of an 
entire important domain of human inquiry, practice, and (one hopes) knowledge, themselves 
spanning metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, and psychology. The chances that two radically 
different theories in such a domain would be evaluatively equivalent is exceedingly low. 
That being said, recall what I said above about degrees of difference between theories. 
Differences between the families of metaethical theories come in degrees, our expectation that 
something evaluative hinges on which of two theories are true should somewhat track how 
similar or different those theories are from one another. The Evaluative Difference Argument is 
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extremely general, but it should not be interpreted as saying that, once radically different theories 
are on the table, something of equal importance is at stake between all of them. 
Finally, it is important to appreciate the defeasibility of the kind of evidence defended by 
the Evaluative Difference Argument. There will be cases where two theories are radically 
different, but not in a respect that matters evaluatively. For example, numbers are valuable and 
important. Not only are they intrinsically interesting, but they allow human beings to understand 
and exercise considerable control over the world. Consider nominalism and Platonism: these are 
radically different accounts of numbers. According to Platonism but not nominalism, 
mathematics is grounded in actual Platonic entities, which have a kind of robust being. Yet, it is 
not clear that there is something evaluatively at stake between nominalism and Platonism. The 
Evaluative Difference Argument is compatible with this observation. As far as the argument says, 
we had prima facie reason to wonder whether something was evaluatively at stake between 
nominalism and Platonism. If we discover that there is nothing evaluatively at stake here (say, 
because everything important and valuable about mathematics is preserved by both theories), 
then we have simply defeated the evidence that the Evaluative Difference Argument points to. 
§3 Some puzzles about metaethical value judgments 
The Evaluative Difference Argument provides some reason to think that metaethical 
disputes, even between rival non-nihilistic theories of morality, are not themselves evaluatively 
idle. So, the project of identifying and defending the correct metaethical value judgments is a live 
one. But there are some reasons for thinking that the project is confused. First, unlike theories 
about God or freedom, metaethical theories themselves interpret value judgments, judgments 
like it is good if moral realism is true or it would be better if moral facts were socially constructed. 
This gives rise to a worry about there being a merely verbal dispute between philosophers who 
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offer competing metaethical value judgments from incompatible metaethical points of view. 
Second, given that metaethical theses purport to be necessary, there seems to be something odd 
about saying that it would be better or worse if one rather than another theory were true, since at 
least one of them could not be true at all. This second problem generalizes to any evaluative 
judgment about a putative metaphysically necessary truth, and so what I say here is of general 
interest beyond metaethics. Finally, in the special case of nihilism, there seems to be something 
even more problematic about saying that it would be bad or worse if nihilism were true, since if 
nihilism were true, nothing would be bad or worse––there would not even be a moral domain to 
theorize about. In the remainder of this section, I develop and address these three problems. 
§3.1 The first puzzle: contested terminology 
It might seem that metaethicists cannot intelligibly hold fixed the meanings of words like 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ when evaluatively contrasting metaethical possibilities, raising the specter of a 
merely verbal dispute. In contrast, in judging that it would be bad if atheism were true, one is not 
employing any terminology that is contested from within the debate about theism. Theists and 
atheists can hold fixed the meanings and referents of words like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in order to 
proceed in a substantive evaluative disagreement about the evaluative upshot of the theistic 
possibility. But metaethical theories themselves give interpretations of the evaluative terms of the 
debate. 
For example, suppose that a moral realist says of the quasi-realist possibility, “It would be 
bad if quasi-realism were true.” The quasi-realist may deny this, asserting instead, “It would not 
be bad if quasi-realism were true.” While the two metaethicists make apparently contradictory 
statements, do they have contradictory meanings? Is the realist really asserting something that 
the quasi-realist is denying? You might think not, if the right way to read the assertions involves 
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interpreting the moral predicates as they are interpreted by the speakers’ theories.32 If that is the 
right way to read such assertions, then the above exchange can be disambiguated as follows: 
Realist: It would be badREAL if quasi-realism were true. 
Quasi-realist: It would be not be badQUASI if quasi-realism were true. 
 
This looks a lot like the disambiguation of a merely verbal dispute, and that would be bad news 
for the project of making and defending metaethical value judgments. While such judgments 
would not be wholly unsalvageable, they would merely become fodder for debates between 
people with shared metaethical commitments. 
Notice first that, if it is right to read the dispute as merely verbal, at least for the reasons 
given, then it does not seem that speakers who endorse incompatible metaethical theories could 
ever successfully engage in any evaluative debate. On such a view, only speakers who endorse 
equivalent (or consistent) metaethical views could intelligibly disagree about what is valuable. 
But this is simply untenable. It is manifest that a quasi-realist and a moral realist can disagree 
about, say, whether the death penalty is morally permissible, without equivocating between 
permissibilityREAL and permissibilityQUASI. And what goes for any ordinary first-order value judgment 
should go for a first-order metaethical value judgment, even if the latter is somewhat exotic. 
There is no reason to think that the specter of a verbal dispute arises only when the subject matter 
is metaethics rather than something else. 
The fact that the meaning of metaethical value judgments are not affected by the speakers’ 
respective theories does not mean that what is actually true metaethically makes no difference to 
nature of the judgments, however. In thinking about how metaethical truth affects the meaning 
of metaethical value judgments, there are two main routes for interpreting the disagreement: we 
																																																								
32 See Francén Olinder (2012, 2016) for an account of “metaethical pluralism,” according to which the truth 
conditions of a speaker’s moral assertions partly depend on her metaethical standpoint. 
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can read the evaluative predicates as moral or non-moral. To illustrate the first strategy, let us 
(for reasons that will become clear momentarily) restrict our attention to non-nihilistic 
possibilities and consider an example metaethical value judgment, with the reading of the 
evaluative terms made explicitly moral: 
[1] It is very morally bad that moral realism is false and quasi-realism is true. 
Notice that there is no obvious reason why [1] cannot be true, even though its propositional form 
implies that quasi-realist theory is in fact correct. Suppose, for example, that quasi-realism really 
is true. The correct way to understand the meaning of [1], in that case, is as an expression of a 
suite of deep desires, commitments, longings, and the like, that take the moral domain, 
realistically construed, as their object. No incoherence arises. 
Even anti-realist theories that do not accommodate talk of truth and moral properties, 
like a simplistic version of emotivism, may still give a semantically vindicatory reading of the 
sentence. On such a view, asserting [1] may simply be a way of expressing disapproval or dislike 
toward the fact that anti-realism rather than realism is true, as in, “Realism––hoorah! Anti-
realism––boo!” And disagreements over [1], if such a view is true, amount to exchanges in which 
speakers try to push each other into having their respective attitudes toward metaethical 
possibilities. 
 Now consider a different assertion, which does not, in the way of [1], imply that some 
anti-realist theory is in fact correct. 
[2]  It is very morally bad if anti-realism rather than moral realism is true. 
Suppose that [2] is asserted by someone in a state of uncertainty about metaethics, for whom 
both realism and anti-realism are epistemically possible. Then, from the point of view of the 
speaker, the best reading of the moral predicate in [2] is simply left open. Here there is no need to 
 
 40 
worry about the implications of assuming that realism is actually false. Again, no incoherence 
arises. 
 In looking more closely at the dialectical possibilities, the sense of a puzzle begins to fade 
away. What became of the appearance of a verbal dispute? The best way to understand evaluative 
debates between speakers who endorse incompatible metaethics is in terms of a shared evaluative 
space on the first-order level, about which there is a theoretical disagreement. In this way, 
evaluative disputes about metaethical possibilities are no different from other evaluative disputes. 
Provided that none of the speakers believe that the truth of their metaethical theory, but not their 
interlocutor’s, would entail the truth of a disputed value judgment (in which case problems of 
circularity threaten), the differing metaethical accounts of the evaluative terminology does not 
pose a special problem. Metaethical value judgments are again shown to be unproblematic 
despite being somewhat exotic. 
§3.2 The second puzzle: metaphysical necessity 
 Suppose we compare two metaethical possibilities and agree that at most one of them is 
metaphysically necessary, and at least one of them is impossible. After all, metaethical theories 
are partly metaphysical in nature, and metaphysical theses characteristically purport to be true of 
metaphysical necessity. This might seem to cause trouble for comparative value judgments about 
the two theories, since we are guaranteed to be evaluating an impossibility. Likewise, it would be 
odd to ask whether it would be better if 10 were prime; it is not even so much as logically possible 
that 10 is prime, and so you might think that it also would not be anything, evaluatively speaking. 
 First, it should be controversial whether metaethical truths are metaphysically necessary. 
There are reasonable doubts about necessity in normative theory, and these might apply to 
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metaethical theory as well.33 It is conceivable that a metaethical theory might be contingently 
true. As an example, consider the following reading of J.L. Mackie’s argument for nihilism in 
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong from the strangeness of moral properties. According to 
Mackie, perhaps there could be such moral properties, for example, “to-be-pursuedness,” but 
they are so strange that they cannot be countenanced in this (allegedly) naturalistic world. Yet the 
world might have been non-naturalistic, and as such have accommodated moral properties. 
Indeed, Mackie seems to have thought that the existence of God could make some kind of 
difference to whether the universe can countenance moral properties. But (so the argument goes) 
since the world is not that way, we should not believe that there are moral properties.34  
I suspect that some will be convinced that metaethical theories might be contingent, but 
many will not be. So, suppose for the sake of argument that metaethical theories are the sorts of 
things that, if true, really are metaphysically necessary. Even if metaethical value judgments are 
unintelligible in reference to known metaphysical impossibilities, they still might be intelligible in 
reference to epistemic possibilities. After all, this is a reasonable way to understand familiar 
evaluative worries about other theses that purport to be necessary, for example, theism.35 As long 
as the existence and non-existence of God are epistemically possible for us, it is sensible for us to 
wonder about which possibility would be better or worse. 
																																																								
33 For some of these doubts, see Gideon Rosen (ms). 
 
34 I have not found many who endorse this reading of Mackie, though one prominent example is Richard Joyce 
(2016a; 2016b, 192 fn. 11). Cf. Jamie Dreier, “Mackie’s Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief.” 
 
35 A widely shared dogma in philosophy of religion says that, if God exists, then God exists necessarily. See 
Swinburne (2004, 79, 148) for doubts and Leftow (2010) for discussion. 
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Perhaps evaluative worries about a known metaphysically necessary or impossible theory 
really are confused or incoherent.36 But it should be controversial whether metaethical value 
judgments are unintelligible even in reference to known metaphysical impossibilities. Some 
philosophers argue––plausibly, in my view––that we can intelligibly distinguish between 
different impossible worlds, as opposed to the view either that there are no impossible worlds, or 
that there is just one impossible world in which all propositions are true.37 If so, then we should 
be able to distinguish between these worlds evaluatively as well. And if we can do that, then we 
can plausibly distinguish between different, even impossible, metaethical worlds evaluatively. For 
example, just as it seems that, if the number 10 were prime, then it would not be divisible by two, 
so it seem that it would be bad if the number 10 suffered constantly and for no reason. If this sort 
of approach is right, then the fact that some metaethical theory is impossible may turn out not to 
prevent the us from intelligibly making a value judgment about its being true or false. 
So the necessary purport of metaethical theses turns out not to be a problem for making 
metaethical value judgments. There is not a cogent worry about verbal dispute, and at the very 
least, such judgments make sense so long as their objects are epistemically possible. Moreover, if 
recent work on distinguishing impossible worlds is right, such judgments can even make sense 
when they regard known metaphysical impossibilities. 
§3.3 The third puzzle: evaluating nihilism 
Recall that in response to the first puzzle, I bracketed the question of moral nihilism. I did 
this because reading the evaluative predicates in metaethical value judgments as moral poses 
																																																								
36 Cf. Kahane (2016): “If nihilism is false, then we could in principle have reasons to fear it, if we don’t know it’s false. 
But such reasons are odd since we could have them only if the object of our fear isn’t realized. And it’s anyway hard 
to see why we would have these reasons if nihilism couldn’t make things worse for us or anyone.” Kahane does not 
distinguish between contingent and necessary version of nihilism, as I do above. 
 
37 See Daniel Nolan (1997) and Linda Zagzebski (1990) for defenses of impossible worlds. 
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special problems if one of the possibilities we are considering is the nihilistic possibility. The 
puzzle is that, if nihilism were true, then nothing would be good or bad. Moral nihilism, unlike 
quasi- and anti-realism, entails the falsity of all first-order moral judgments–– including 
metaethical value judgments. 
The best response to this puzzle is to interpret the evaluative predicates with contents not 
contested by moral nihilism. The judgment that it is bad if moral nihilism is true must not receive 
a moral interpretation for its evaluative predicate. If the value in question is not moral, then the 
third puzzle evaporates. There is no problem if the value that nihilism denies is not the kind of 
value predicated of metaethical possibilities. 
Of course, this solution––and much else that I have said so far––only works if we do not 
believe, and are not considering, global evaluative nihilism, or what is sometimes called 
normative nihilism. If we believe that global evaluative nihilism is true, then I doubt that there 
remains anything about which we can intelligibly ask evaluative questions. The only appeal in 
that case might be to impossible worlds, although even that would suffer from semantic 
mysteries about how we would get a purchase on evaluative terminology at all, in a globally 
nihilistic context. Consider: If some causal theory of reference is true, for example, the popular 
theory due to Kripke and Putnam, then it might be that persons within even merely contingently 
nihilistic worlds cannot refer to moral properties, though such properties are possible. They 
would be like Putnam’s brains in vats, whose lack of referential access to brains and vats 
precludes them from even so much as formulating the hypothesis that they are brains in vats. In 
our context, this view would yield the parallel consequence that there can only be contingent 
nihilists in worlds where contingent nihilism is false. This is because contingent nihilism is 
impossible to believe or even contemplate without referring to moral properties, and, according 
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to the causal theory of reference, such reference is impossible in a world without such properties. 
(If this is right, then the existence of contingent nihilists would be decisive evidence that 
contingent nihilism is false!) 
To sum up, the only way that the world might be that would undermine the making of 
metaethical value judgments is globally nihilistic. Even local forms of nihilism are compatible 
with the making of metaethical value judgments, since the evaluative predicates in such 
judgments may receive interpretations outside the domain in which the local form of nihilism is 
true. 
§4 Conclusion 
 In the first two sections, I showed that the value and importance of morality combined 
with the radically different accounts of it given by competing metaethical theories provides us 
with some evidence that these theories have different evaluative upshot. And in the third section, 
I dispelled doubts about the coherence or sense of making metaethical value judgments in the 
first place. If these two arguments are successful, then we have a satisfying way of insisting that 
metaethics matters. It is not the case that what matters evaluatively is one thing, and metaethics 
another. Rather, metaethical possibilities themselves fall under the purview of normative 
philosophy––we may evaluate such possibilities just as we do possibilities in religion, philosophy 
of mind, or anything else, and we should expect that the possibilities are quite different in 
evaluative upshot. 
 Value questions about metaethics, then, belong alongside other examples of what Guy 
Kahane calls “the value question in metaphysics.”38 And since morality is a very, if not the most, 
																																																								
38 Kahane (2012). 
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important domain of human discourse and practice, it belongs alongside the other so-called “big 





Chapter 3: Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, philosophers express angst about the existence of God, the 
immortality of the soul39, freedom of the will, the nature of mind40, the metaphysics of modality41, 
and other subjects. On such issues, some of us do not only try to figure out what is true, we worry 
about it. Consider the case of theism. Positions range anywhere from the view that life is 
meaningless without God, to the view that it is terrible with God.42 Less attention has been 
devoted to similar questions in metaethics. Yet, just as someone might not only wonder, but 
worry about whether theism is true––so they might not just wonder, but worry about whether a 
particular metaethical theory is true. Given the immense importance of morality, it is somewhat 
surprising that questions of angst in this area of inquiry have been neglected. This paper, I hope, 
gives angsty metaethics the attention that it deserves.43 
																																																								
39 Eli Hirsch (2009, 2, 20) says that death and radical deception are “ineffably horrible” and “undermine everything 
that I have ever cared about in my life.” 
 
40 Jerry Fodor (1989, 77) says that “if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, 
and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my saying…. If 
none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the 
world.” 
 
41 Robert Adams (1979) argues that modal realism justifies “moral indifference.” 
 
42 See the essays recently published in Kraay (2018). 
 
43 See Guy Kahane (2012)’s pioneering work on what he calls the “value question in metaphysics.” Although Kahane 
is more narrowly interested in evaluative judgments rather than full-fledged philosophical angst, this paper could be 
read partly as a metaethical contribution to the general research program advanced by Kahane.  
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After sketching a general account of philosophical angst, I describe and defend a 
particular instance of it: angst regarding moral realism. Following the convention in the literature 
on the value of God’s existence, in which “pro-theist” is used to refer to someone who thinks that 
it is good that God exists (whether or not they believe that God actually exists), I will use “pro-
realist” to refer to someone who hopes that moral realism is true and worries that it might not be 
(whether or not they believe that realism is true). According to pro-realists, the truth of realism is 
extremely important, and there are no adequate theoretical alternatives: it is realism or bust. The 
phenomenon of pro-realism is immediately recognizable, but it is less obvious how one might 
understand and defend it. After all, as long as moral nihilism is false, how could something of 
great normative significance hang on which non-nihilistic metaethic is true? This paper seeks to 
both make angst about moral realism intelligible and to commend one way that pro-realists can 
make their case to the angst-free. That being said, I do not pretend to have exhausted the 
considerations that might motivate (or defeat) philosophical angst about moral realism. 
§1 Philosophical Angst 
 Perhaps we know philosophical angst when we see it, but it is useful to have a more exact 
account in order to isolate angst-inducing phenomena in any particular domain. Here is how I 
understand the phenomenon: Philosophical angst is a complex cognitive judgment combined 
with a conative component. The judgment is that something existentially important is also 
irreplaceable. Existential importance is positive importance to the fundamental meaning, 
intelligibility, or overall value of our lives and the world. If you think that a claim might be false 
but do not think that its truth is important in this sense, then you do not count as angsty. 
Irreplaceability means that there is no available surrogate for whatever plays the important role in 
question. If you think that an existentially important claim might be false but you also think that 
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some alternative claim would do just as well, then you do not count as angsty. The conative 
component, licensed by the judgment, is a kind of anxiety that what is important and 
irreplaceable in this sense is unavailable. Notice that, to be philosophically angsty, one need not 
believe the claim that one is angsty about, but both the claim and its falsity must at least be live 
options.44 
It is no surprise that the most typical catalysts for philosophical angst are subjects 
including God, freedom, and death, rather than the ontology of numbers or the semantics of 
counterfactuals. The former but not the latter subjects are especially significant in how we think 
about the meaning of our lives. But this explanation in terms of existential significance makes it 
at least somewhat surprising that metaethics is not subject to more angsty reflection than it is. 
After all, metaethics concerns the metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, and psychology of 
arguably the most important domain of value that there is––and minimally, a very important 
one.45 As a candidate for philosophical angst, metaethics seems intuitively closer to the 
philosophy of religion than to the ontology of numbers. 
The metaethicist who most readily comes to mind as angsty is probably Derek Parfit. In 
On What Matters, Parfit famously (to some, notoriously) declares that, if metaethical non-
naturalism is false, then nothing matters.46 This declaration satisfies the cognitive conditions for 
philosophical angst, provided that it includes or presupposes the thought that it is existentially 
																																																								
44 For a full account of philosophical angst, see Chapter 1. 
 
45 See my “Metaethical Value Judgments” (ms) for a general argument that we should expect different metaethical 
theories to have significantly different evaluative upshot. 
 
46 “If there were no such facts [facts that only “irreducibly normative claims” could state], and we didn’t need to 
make such claims, Sidgwick, Ross, I, and others would have wasted much of our lives. We have asked what matters, 
which acts are right or wrong, and what we have reasons to want, and to do. If Naturalism were true, there would be 
no point in trying to answer such questions. Our consolation would be only that it wouldn’t matter that we had 
wasted much of our lives, since we would have learnt that nothing matters” (Parfit 2011, 367). 
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important that something matters, and that no rival theory secures an adequate replacement for 
non-naturalist mattering. But Parfit’s angst is narrower than it appears at first glance. He thinks 
that views rival to his collapse into nihilism or something very close to nihilism. And Parfit does 
not offer a substantive proposal for why things matter only on his metaethical view; rather, their 
mattering only on his view is an immediate logical or conceptual consequence of the ways that he 
has (somewhat idiosyncratically) defined the relevant terminology and concepts, as several 
commentators have pointed out.47 Because he thinks that his rivals’ views collapse into nihilism, 
Parfit’s angst really amounts to the worry that nothing matters if nihilism is true––a claim much 
less controversial than it seemed at first. Moreover, it is not even clear that Parfit thinks it would 
be a bad thing if nihilism were true. Indeed, in volume 3 of On What Matters, he distances 
himself from the claim that it matters whether something matters.48 
These limitations of Parfit’s angst provide a good foil for illustrating some of the central 
concerns of this chapter. In contrast to Parfit, we might be angsty about metaethics not because 
we think that most views collapse into nihilism. We might instead think that, despite the fact that 
many views do not collapse into nihilism, they nevertheless fail to accommodate something 
irreplaceably important to the meaning or intelligibility of our lives. This latter kind of angst 
permits more philosophical charity, because it evaluates theories on their own terms, allowing 
that they basically accomplish what they purport to. In this chapter, I am wondering about 
metaethical angst in this richer, more charitable sense. While I will discuss realism’s relationship 
to moral nihilism in its own right, I will not only discuss that; I am also interested in how realism 
compares to its non-nihilistic rivals––even when they succeed by their own lights. Compare: in 
																																																								
47 See Street (2017), Temkin (2017), and Driver (2017). 
 
48 See n. 14. 
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thinking about freedom of the will, someone might be angsty if, in their view, only libertarianism 
about freedom secures something (in particular, libertarian freedom) that is both existentially 
important and irreplaceable. But this is substantively different from thinking that only 
libertarianism secures freedom in any sense. Someone (even a libertarian) may grant that 
compatibilist theories genuinely secure freedom of the will, but nevertheless still insist that such 
theories do not secure something extremely valuable or existentially important about the nature 
of freedom of the will, as it is described by libertarianism. 
In short, angst about moral realism, or pro-realism, is the view that the truth of moral 
realism is necessary for something irreplaceable and existentially important to our lives going 
well, combined with the worry that realism might be false. This does not mean, however, that the 
pro-realist must think that all alternative theories collapse into moral nihilism. 
§2 How to be angsty about moral realism 
In this paper, I am concerned with moral realism in a fairly robust sense. According to 
moral realism in this sense, there are objective moral facts, and these can serve as the content of 
true beliefs in the same way that characteristically descriptive non-moral facts may do so (for 
example, the facts that human beings evolved or that two and two make four). We are able to 
know and express moral reality in propositional form, and we have, by-and-large, made genuine 
progress in moral inquiry. The moral facts are both necessary and radically response- or stance-
independent, in that they are not fundamentally grounded in human minds or attitudes, whether 
individual, collective, actual, ideal, or otherwise hypothetical.49 Pro-realism says that something 
about this picture irreplaceably plays an existentially important role in the meaning or 
																																																								
49 Notice that I have said nothing about the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction, even though “robust” moral 
realism is often associated with the latter. I am unbothered if my characterization of realism entails or otherwise 
requires non-naturalism, but I am also not committed to its doing so.   
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intelligibility of our lives, and so the fact that realism might be false warrants anxiety. It is not 
possible here to canvass all instances of non-realism in their dizzying variety, so in what follows I 
will highlight three general contrasts: the contrast between realism and moral nihilism, between 
realism and anti-realism, and, finally, between realism and quasi-realism. 
The reasons for judging that it would be bad if moral nihilism were true are distinct from 
the reasons for judging that it would be bad if any form of non-realism (including both anti- and 
quasi-realism) were true. Unlike moral nihilism, anti- and quasi-realist theories are what I will 
call vindicatory metaethics, in the sense that they (by their own lights) justify moral discourse and 
practice. In short, they are not self-conceived as error theories. The pro-realist, however, is not 
only concerned that morality be given a positive account, à la non-nihilism (a hope that anti- and 
quasi-realists may also satisfy), but that it be given a distinctly realistic account. It is not just 
morality per se that the pro-realist thinks enjoys existentially important irreplaceability, but 
morality realistically construed. 
§2.1 The badness of moral nihilism 
Consider a simple example of an unmitigated injustice. In the History of the 
Peloponnesian War, Thucydides gives us an exchange between some Athenian invaders and their 
victims, the Melians. The Melians have no chance of resisting conquest. In emphasizing the 
pointlessness of resistance, the Athenians accurately observe that “the strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must.”50 What does this have to do with metaethics? If moral 
nihilism is true––that is, if morality is bunk––then there is no moral problem with the 
aforementioned relationship between the strong and the weak. The dominance of the strong over 
the weak may be painful or regrettable in some non-moral sense, but it would not be morally 
																																																								
50 Thucydides (1996, 5.89, 416). 
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unjustified or otherwise morally objectionable. This is a good ground for angst about the 
prospect of moral nihilism, because it seems bad that there would be no grounds for objecting 
morally to this pitiful state of affairs. Not morally bad, of course––after all, nothing morally 
substantive follows from the truth of moral nihilism. But bad in some kind of non-moral sense; 
our lives (or, at least, the lives of the weak) are worse off if they lack grounds for moral objection. 
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to hope that morality is not bunk. 
This simple argument is intuitive, but is the hope really reasonable? In what non-moral 
sense is it “bad” to lack moral justification? As mentioned, it cannot be that moral nihilism 
results in some morally bad situation, since nihilism results in no morally valenced situations at 
all. Moreover, morality does not itself prevent the strong from doing what they can or the weak 
from suffering what they must; morality does not change the world. If morality does not change 
the world, then it is hard to see how nihilism would be bad even in a prudential or instrumental 
sense. What good does it do us that we can legitimately morally object to something, if it is just 
going to happen anyway? 
Nowadays it is common to distinguish between multiple domains of value, including but 
not limited to morality, meaning, aesthetics, and self-interest. One’s life might be good along 
some dimensions but not others. A predominantly self-interested person might live a life 
abounding in prudential value (say, they always get what they want) but sorely lacking in moral 
value. Likewise, the “moral saint” might live a life abounding in moral value but sorely lacking in 
meaning.51 The acknowledgement that moral value does not exhaust the values that we should 
(and do) care about is an advancement beyond a myopic focus on moral value. However, it is 
also important to see that moral value may contribute to, or even be required for, the fulfillment 
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of other kinds of value. It is true that a person’s life may be abounding in moral worth yet lacking 
in meaning, but it is also true that a life entirely lacking in moral worth may––in virtue of that 
lack––suffer from meaninglessness. In answering the question about what kind of badness 
accrues to us if nihilism is true, the pro-realist must appeal to one of the non-moral domains of 
value to which moral value nevertheless contributes. The domain of meaning is well-suited to 
this purpose. 
What morality does, vis-à-vis the Athenian-Melian dynamic, is secure for us a particular 
normative standing in virtue of which we enjoy an authoritative claim against injustices. It is 
much better that we have this kind of standing and claim, even when we have no way of 
enforcing it. It is good––even non-morally good––to be morally worth treating well. Unjustified 
harms and oppression cause one’s life to go poorly, but one’s life is better if one has available an 
authoritative protest––even when it is ineffective. Such a protest secures meaning in the midst of 
harms, in that it makes one’s condition intelligible as morally unjustified, and objectionable on 
these grounds. There is no adequate, non-moral replacement for this standing and claim if 
morality is bunk. At best, the death of morality leaves in its wake various instrumental and 
epistemic norms, but these are not even inconsistent with the aims and values that the Athenians 
press against the Melians. Moral standing differs from other kinds of standing not in degree, but 
in quality. Over and above instrumental, epistemic, and other norms, moral standing provides 
the strong with a powerful reason not to harm the weak. 
This defense of angst about nihilism locates something that morality delivers for us and 
appeals to its irreplaceability and importance in our lives. It is worth noting that this view is 
consonant with some provocative remarks by Thomas Nagel regarding the importance of 
inviolability in any account of moral rights. Nagel writes, “What actually happens to us is not the 
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only thing we care about: What may be done to us is also important, quite apart from whether or 
not it is done to us—and the same is true of what we may do as opposed to what we actually do” 
(108). Again, “not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be 
permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil.” And finally, 
We can distinguish the desirability of not being tortured from the desirability of its being impermissible to 
torture us; we can distinguish the desirability of not being murdered from the desirability of our murder's 
being impermissible; we can distinguish the desirability of not being coerced from the desirability of its 
being impermissible to coerce us. These are distinct subjects, and they have distinct values. To be tortured 
would be terrible; but to be tortured and also to be someone whom it was not wrong to torture would be 
even worse (111). 
 
Being the sort of being whom it is permissible to torture is bad, even despite the fact that it is in 
another way worse to be “killed unjustly than, say, accidentally.” Nagel’s point is not that 
permissible torture or murder are themselves worse than their impermissible counterparts; 
rather, it is “being someone it is not wrong to torture” that is worse than being someone it is 
wrong to torture––whether or not one is tortured. 
Objection: What if the realist world is such that, even if it has moral value, it is, on the 
whole, very bad for us––for example, if it is full of little more than intense and constant suffering, 
and the best normative theory says that the suffering is morally unjustified? Does the non-moral 
goodness of mere (violated) moral status really outweigh or otherwise trump such a state of 
affairs? Surely, a realistic possibility is only better than its nihilistic counterpart if the net value in 
the world, for us, turns out positive. In contrast to a very morally bad realistic world, an 
otherwise good or even so-so nihilistic world seems better for us. If moral nihilism is true, then 
what is otherwise unjust suffering is not morally bad at all; it is nothing, morally speaking. And it 
is plausible that a set of morally bad states is worse than a set of states that are neither morally 
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good nor bad. So, perhaps it is not true as a general proposition that it is better if realism rather 
than moral nihilism is true.52 
In response to this objection, consider an implication of the view it commends. If an 
otherwise morally bad state is better if it is neither morally good nor morally bad, then finding 
out that one’s otherwise unjust suffering is morally neutral should be encouraging news. If a 
would-be morally bad state (say, the state of being betrayed) was better on moral nihilism, then 
finding out that moral nihilism is true should be a kind of appropriate comfort for a person 
experiencing betrayal. Such a discovery would not alleviate a person’s anger or unhappiness, but 
it would mean that they were not morally wronged, and that no particular reactions are morally 
justified. 
But this appeal to moral nihilism for comfort is wrongheaded. It is better not only that 
there is moral value; it is better even that morally bad things really are so. If one is deciding 
between having a set of morally neutral things (say, trips to the beach) or a separate set of moral 
evils (say, trips to the torture chamber), then, all else equal, it is reasonable to choose the neutral 
things. If the question of preferring realism over nihilism were analogous to such a decision, then 
it would be reasonable to prefer nihilism in some of these cases. It is from this fact that the 
objection derives its plausibility. But this is not the right way to think about comparing 
metaethical possibilities. The would-be goods and evils must be held fixed in the comparison: this 
																																																								
52 This sort of thought motivates Kahane (2016). As noted above, it is also given expression at various points by 
Parfit in Vol. 3 of On What Matters, e.g., “It is a difficult question whether and how it matters whether anything 
matters. If we believe that suffering matters greatly, we may regret this fact. We might try to believe that, as Nihilists 
claim, nothing matters, because we have no reason to care about anything. We might then conclude in despair that 
Nihilism is false, because some things, such as suffering, really do matter.” Again, “I don’t know whether I would be 
… very disappointed if I came to believe that nothing matters in [the] reason-involving sense. I am not glad, for 
example, that suffering matters. But since I believe that we have reasons to care about suffering, and that we have 
other, weaker reasons to care about some other things, I am trying to understand these reasons better.” Unlike Parfit, 
I am glad that suffering matters. 
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bit of would-be mercy, this instance of would-be wrongful treatment, etc. We are considering not 
just whether we have certain goods or evils period, but what it would be like if the very things we 
already rightly believe to be good or bad (like torture) were not really so. 
Contrasting moral nihilism and non-nihilism bears some similarity to contrasting first-
order normative theories that have different evaluative upshots, with the aim of figuring out 
which would be better. When contrasting Kantianism and Utilitarianism, for example, it is not 
dialectically appropriate to radically change what the world is like when one imagines the truth of 
the rival theory. In wondering whether it would be better if Kantianism rather than 
Utilitarianism is true (as Nagel does), it is not appropriate to simultaneously toggle whether or 
not pleasure and pain states exist. Rather, one holds fixed the world as it otherwise is––including 
the existence of pleasures, pains, and rational capacities––and imagines the implications of 
Kantianism and Utilitarianism for this world. 
To illustrate the general view on offer with an example, not only is torturing innocent 
uncles for fun morally bad, but we rightly do not want it to be otherwise. The question of 
whether torturing for fun is good or bad is not itself an evaluatively idle question. It is good for 
uncles, and for us, that it is impermissible to torture them for fun. This higher order desire is 
itself normatively justified, in addition to the justification for the first-order view itself. A world 
in which torturing innocent uncles is morally permissible, let alone good––holding everything 
else fixed––is worse than one in which it is morally evil. That is to say, it is to some extent better 
that torturing innocent uncles is morally bad rather than morally good.  
The intuition that the permissibility of torture would itself be bad is related to a popular 
normative objection to simplistic versions of divine command theory, according to which one 
ought to do whatever God happens to command. The objection says that such a theory allows 
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God to make it the case that actually evil actions are good, and that this counts against the appeal 
of the theory. Returning to the Melian dialogue, the point here is not that the Melians should be 
happy that their moral claim and status are violated, nor should they wish that their violation was 
in fact permissible. Rather, the point is that they should prefer having a moral claim and status, 
given the facts that actually constitute the violation, to not having them. 
 Ultimately, one need not be convinced by the details either of Nagel’s view or my view 
regarding, respectively, what is important about either a deontological first-order theory of 
morality or a non-nihilistic metaethic. Whatever one thinks are the goods (including non-moral 
goods) conferred to us by morality, these are vindicated by any non-nihilistic metaethical theory. 
In other words, take whatever goods you think are delivered by the best first-order moral theory. 
These goods are, in turn, vindicated by the true non-nihilistic metaethic, and it is to these that we 
can refer in justifying an angsty aversion to the possibility of nihilism. In order to reject this 
argument, you must think that morality makes no net-positive non-moral contribution to our 
lives. If, per impossible, we could choose whether to live in a morally nihilistic or non-nihilistic 
world, and could not appeal to moral values in making the decision, the person who rejects the 
argument of this section must say that we have no positive reason to choose the non-nihilistic 
world. And that, I think, is very implausible. 
§2.2 The badness of anti-realism 
To consider moral nihilism is to consider the possibility that there are none of the goods 
of morality; accordingly, these goods are dialectically available for licensing evaluative judgments 
about the possibility of moral nihilism. Moral anti-realism is trickier, because to consider anti-
realism is to consider whether there are a great number of the goods of morality, but understood 
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in an anti-realistic way.53 Speaking loosely, angst about moral nihilism is concern about the 
existence of morality, but angst about anti-realism is concern about the nature of morality. 
The rest of this subsection applies to anti-realist theories other than quasi-realism, due to 
special complexities arising from the pan-expressivist or minimalist semantic program partly 
constitutive of quasi-realism. In going expressivist or minimalist at every level of discourse about 
the moral, the quasi-realist makes it especially difficult to say how quasi-realism differs from 
realism in its depiction of the moral domain, which in turn makes it difficult to say what is at 
stake between the two theories. Because this issue arises for none of the other varieties of anti-
realism, it is useful to categorize and treat them separately. 
So what is angst-inducing about (non-quasi) anti-realism? Why might it induce angst in 
someone if the moral badness of, say, murder is not realistically construed? Why might it induce 
angst in someone if moral facts are, say, constructions grounded in collections of subjective 
attitudes? Or if moral truths are contingent commitments that human beings have endorsed over 
time, for evolutionarily-specified purposes? Or if moral facts are, fundamentally, facts about the 
results of idealized decision-procedures among fully-informed agents? 
Standard, longstanding disagreements between realists and anti-realists would suggest 
answers having to do with objectivity, non-contingency, and the like. I suspect that there is 
something potentially regrettable in the anti-realistic interpretation of each of these aspects of 
morality, but the answer that I want to pursue here has to do with what I consider to be the 
radically independent character of moral justification if moral realism is true. Following Sharon 
																																																								
53 Note on terminology: There is an unfortunate terminological parallel between “pro-realism” and “anti-realism.” 
With “anti-realism” I refer to anti-realist metaethics, not an angsty aversion to moral realism. In Chapter 4, I employ 
the only slightly happier term, “anti-moral realism”, to refer to the angsty aversion to moral realism. 
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Street, I regard some kind of mind- or response-dependence of moral phenomena to be 
constitutive of moral anti-realism. Here is Street: 
According to the anti-realist, if an agent has normative reason to X, then this conclusion must somehow 
follow from within her own practical point of view: if the conclusion that she has reason to X is not entailed 
from within the standpoint constituted by her own set of evaluative attitudes, then she does not have that 
reason.54 
 
As Street elaborates in a footnote, “the point of contention between realists and anti-realists 
about normativity is the answer to the central question of Plato’s Euthyphro (in rough secular 
paraphrase): are things valuable ultimately because we value them (anti-realism), or do some 
things possess a value that holds independently of us and our attitudes (realism)?”55 Street locates 
her own view on the anti-realist side of this “Euthyphronic” account of the debate. (Notice that 
Street’s own exclusion of quasi-realism in this part of the discussion is what permits the 
Euthyphronic account, since quasi-realists emphatically deny that things possess moral value in a 
response-dependent way.) 
 Street’s exact characterization is a bit too narrow for my purposes, since it seems to count 
idealizing theories as realistic. It is also too focused on an agent’s normative reasons, rather than 
moral value and truth generally. The version of the realist/anti-realist distinction that will I utilize 
here counts our hypothetical, idealized, and collective responses as part of “us and our attitudes.” 
So, here is the modified definition of anti-realism that I will employ in what follows: 
According to anti-realism, moral truths hold in virtue of us and our attitudes, broadly construed: if a 
putative moral truth is not grounded in our evaluative attitudes––whether actual or idealized––then it is 
not a moral truth. 
 
Following this taxonomy, if moral realism is true, then it is not just the case that our moral 
reasons are external in the traditional sense of being object-given, or intrinsic to the situations or 
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55 Street (2016, fn. 9). 
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objects that our reasons are about or for––after all, these very claims can be true in virtue of facts 
about moral agents qua valuing beings. And it is not just the case that moral properties are this 
way––after all, even a simple version of subjectivism can consistently claim that torture is wrong 
because it causes unjustified pain, not because anyone thinks it is wrong. It is the metaphysical 
grounds of such truths that are at issue. On realism, we may have moral reasons, and things have 
moral properties, in virtue of a system of moral truths that is itself independent of persons and 
their attitudes. Various metaethical parties offering positive accounts of morality may agree to 
some version of the claim that, for example, the suffering and oppression of the weak generates 
an object-given reason for us to care and do something, and that these reasons are reasons to stop 
something that is itself morally bad whether or not anyone thinks so. But there is an additional 
kind of independence involved in the true moral verdict: morality itself, the system of moral 
truths itself, declares in favor of the oppressed, ruling their oppression a normative 
impossibility––with no reference to human moral attitudes in the grounds of this impossibility. 
When we think rightly, we concur with this verdict that did not come from us, either literally in 
our needing to issue it, or metaphysically in our attitudes, independent or collective, being 
needed to ground it. 
Is angst on this basis intelligible? One way of beginning to see that it is, is to appreciate 
how realistic independence is qualitatively rather than quantitatively different from anti-realistic 
independence. There is, the pro-realist can concede, a kind of anti-realistic independence that is 
a matter of degree or interpersonal distance, which I will call the quantitative sense of 
independence. Consider, for example, a view on which moral claims are true in virtue of their 
being the subject of hypothetical agreement among idealized agents. The pro-realist should not 
deny that there is a recognizable kind of independence involved in such an account. After all, this 
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kind of view explicitly distances moral truths from the actual responses of individuals. But notice 
that the view does not make moral truth at all independent of individual responses in what I call 
the qualitative sense. After all, on this kind of anti-realism, the responses of each person’s 
idealized self are partly constitutive of the moral truth, and so the truth is still tethered to 
responses. The same goes for other response-dependent theories. For instance, any view on 
which moral claims are true in virtue of one’s robust, consistent attitudes over time, is a view on 
which there is quantitative independence, but it is independence of the anti-realist kind that is 
explicable in terms of degrees of distance from the actual responses of individuals. Anti-realist 
moral truth is still tethered to actual, individual responses. 
In being qualitatively different, realistic independence is not just one more step on the 
ladder up and away from the actual attitudes of individuals. From the pro-realist point of view, 
for the system of moral truths to be really independent is for it to be independent of our attitudes 
in any sense––wholly untethered from actual, individual responses. This is what I mean by the 
“radical independence” of moral truth. After all, even the rational agreements among our 
idealized selves are subject to the strictures and demands of a realistic morality. From the realist 
point of view, rational agreement among idealized selves might always produce true judgments, 
but such success is understood as the success of tracking, rather than constituting or 
constructing, the independent truth.  
So far, I have made some effort to characterize the difference between realistic and anti-
realistic independence, but I have not yet attempted to explain what would be so good (and 
irreplaceable) about realistic independence. First, a caveat: someone who finds moral realism of 
the sort described to be itself unintelligible will struggle to see how there can be anything other 
than degreed (and hence tethered) independence from individual responses. In a way, such a 
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person is not the target of my arguments, any more than the person who claims not to 
understand the concept of God is a target of arguments that it would be good if God exists. On 
the other hand, I do want to show that, given that someone thinks that there is such a possibility, 
it is at the very least rationally intelligible that they would not find anti-realist independence a 
fitting surrogate for realist independence. Fitting surrogates must be relevantly similar in kind to 
their originals, and I aim to show that anti-realist independence is not such a surrogate for 
realistic independence. 
The pro-realist claims that the radically independent nature of moral justification is good, 
but not merely good; it plays an existentially significant role in the meaning and intelligibility of 
our lives.56 This is because it militates against a kind of normative lonesomeness or moral 
bootstrapping, in which––in one way or another, at bottom––we are responsible (either causally 
or constitutively) for providing our own moral vindication.57 Again, I allow that pro-realist angst 
might be only intelligible from within the perspective of someone who “gets” what it would be 
like to see morality in a realist way, in which context radically independent moral justification is 
																																																								
56 Here it is worth noting that, in a continental context, my account of why anti-realism rightly induces philosophical 
angst is closest to the account of angst (or anxiety, or dread) one finds in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 
and “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Sartre locates the origin of anxiety in the fact that human beings are radically 
responsible not only for their own actions but for the very principles that guide them––in the sense that there is no 
objective, independent moral reality that determines this in advance. Of course, Sartre did not have in mind 
contemporary metaethical categories and one cannot know whether he would have also rejected anti-realism, but my 
account of what is lost without realism is recognizably closer to his than it is to, say, the systems of Soren 
Kierkegaard or Martin Heidegger, who have quite different concerns when they speak of angst. 
 
57 Cf. the following extended excerpt from Wright (1995: 226), who makes a related point (though one whose import 
he ultimately rejects) about external sanction: “In general … the immediate price of anti-realism about morals is 
merely[!] that the gravity of moral judgement will lack an external sanction. When one is asked, 'Why bother to try 
to arrive at correct moral opinion?', the only available answer will be: because such an opinion informs better 
conduct - better, that is, from a moral point of view. The value of moral truth will thus be an instrumental, moral 
value. It is common to think that there are, by contrast, intrinsic, general values associated with pure discovery, 
understanding and knowledge of the real world. Properly to characterise and to understand such values seems to me 
to be a very difficult task. In any case, for the moral anti-realist, that kind of value cannot attach to moral truth. But I 
think it has seemed important that it should only because of the tendency of philosophers to suppose that there is 
nothing for truth to be that is not associated with value of that sort.” 
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available. But against the backdrop of such radical independence, there seems to be little 
difference, vis-à-vis bootstrapping, between the different degrees of quantitative, tethered 
independence available on anti-realism. Relative to a realist framework, increasing the degrees of 
tethered independence is like increasing the length or complexity of a bit of circular reasoning for 
a desired conclusion.  
Here is an elaboration of the analogy to circular reasoning. Imagine that you take yourself 
to have an independent (now, in the sense of non-circular) argument for an existentially 
important claim (say, that human beings are worthy of respect). You then encounter a group of 
theorists (these are the analogues to anti-realists) who give a variety of circular arguments for the 
important claim. If circular reasoning is all these theorists think there could ever be, then, 
perhaps, length and complexity is the most you could want or hope for in terms of 
“independence”. But once one sees––or takes oneself to see––an independent, non-circular route 
to the important claim, it makes sense that the circular routes, including the longest and most 
complex among them, will pale in comparison. Anti-realistic justification is to realistic 
justification as circular justification (for an important claim) is to non-circular reasoning. 
Although anti-realistic justification is not formally circular, contrasted with realistic justification, 
it is as disturbingly self-referential. 
More can be said to defend the intelligibility of pro-realist angst. Although the 
considerations that follow do not depend on the analogy to circular reasoning, they are similar in 
spirit. Perhaps ironically, the perspective on offer here is sympathetic to (but not quite the same 
as) an argument due to the quasi-realist Simon Blackburn, who is hardly a friend of the sort of 
robust moral realism in consideration here. Blackburn argues that several anti-realist views face a 
problem of moral relativism. For example, Blackburn offers the following objection to the 
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constructivist metaethic associated with Christine Korsgaard, according to which each person is 
rationally bound to self-legislate moral norms in virtue of an inescapable practical identity. 
Korsgaard’s view, he says, fails to preclude “pluralities of self-legislating persons whose identities 
are happily bound up in various constraints they set themselves under, but who unfortunately 
find these constraints in entirely different places.”58 How does this relate to pro-realism? The pro-
realist may adapt Blackburn’s worry into the present discussion by saying that what would be bad 
or regrettable about Korsgaardian constructivism––even if it turned out to be true––is precisely 
that, between any two different persons or communities of persons who locate normative 
constraints “in entirely different places,” there is no radically independent source of authority to 
adjudicate the dispute, to vindicate either one side or none. This is reminiscent of the concern 
about moral bootstrapping that I expressed with an analogy to circular reasoning: if everyone can 
appeal to “constraints they set themselves under”, then they are ultimately justified self-
referentially, by concerns that others need not share. 
To illustrate the point by another route, consider yet another challenge by Blackburn, this 
time aimed squarely at the moral realist. Blackburn demands that the moral realist explain what 
more it is important to “say” about moral evils beyond the moral condemnation to which anti-
realists are equally entitled. “What is wrong with [the Taliban in its relation to women] is that the 
men oppress the women, impoverish their lives, and keep them in a state of ignorance and 
inactivity. Why should we feel any urge to say more than that? Isn’t it bad enough?”59 The pro-
realist should reply: the urge is not that there be something else that we might say, but that there 
																																																								
58 Blackburn (1999: 219). It must also be noted that Blackburn criticizes several theses associated with realism on the 
same grounds: in particular, McDowell’s sense theory and neo-Aristotelian accounts that ground morality in a 
conception of human flourishing (218-220). 
 
59 Blackburn (1999: 223). 
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be more than just “we” saying it. The traditional realist answer was that the Taliban is not just 
wrong, but objectively and robustly so. The angsty realist does not deny this. But the really 
important point is that it is not the saying of such a thing that matters. It is rather that there is an 
independent verdict issued, as it were, by reality itself. What is “said” remains the same. Earlier I 
said that true moral statements “concur” with an independent verdict. The point is that true 
moral assertions are repetitions, restatements of a reality already partly constituted by the truths 
that the assertions express, much like two and two make four or no sphere has corners are 
reiterations of radically response-independent realities. 
Finally, it is worth considering a somewhat peculiar objection. The objection is worth 
considering not because it is necessarily powerful in itself, but because it helps to illustrate one 
further (and final) way of bolstering the intelligibility of pro-realist angst. Some readers might 
suspect that there is a kind of crypto-theism lurking in the background of the perspective just 
advanced, and they might want to launch a debunking argument against pro-realism on that 
basis. Isn’t pro-realist just a watered down version of angst about the “death of God”, who 
provided a kind of robust, external reference point for morality and meaning? In a way, the 
suspicions is right, but it provides confirmation of the overall framework defended here. Think of 
the familiar existential desires associated with theism: to “have God on our side”, or not to be 
“alone in the universe,” or to achieve and to see “cosmic” justice.60 These desires plausibly derive 
from fundamental religious attitudes for which realist value is also fitting. Incidentally, they also 
provide additional support for David Killoren’s recent argument that robust moral realism is a 
kind of “religion.”61 Even if this connection may in turn provide grounds for a kind of debunking 
																																																								
60 The terms in quotation marks are pulled from the ether, not any particular source. 
61 David Killoren (2016). 
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argument against a certain style of religiously-infused moral theorizing, that is a matter of what is 
true, not what would be better––and irreplaceable.62 (It would, of course, be disappointing for 
pro- realists if the very grounds of their angst could be employed as defeaters for realism itself!) 
Notice further that the sorts of replies that the angst-free may give to pro-realists are manifestly 
unsatisfying in their analogue religious form. To the pro-theist who desperately wants not to be 
“alone in the universe,” it is hardly comforting that some naturalistic construal of God––say, that 
God is identical to humanity’s highest ideals––also gives us a kind of company in the universe, in 
the form of our ideals being with us. If anything, the linkage to the religious case reinforces, at 
least, the intelligibility of angsty dissatisfaction with the falsity of realism. 
None of this is to say that moral realism is true; the point is that it is intelligible to regard 
its truth as preferable to its falsity, and that we can come to appreciate the reasons why someone 
might so prefer. Put another way, were we––per impossible––deciding in advance what kind of 
nature the moral domain is to have, we would have some good grounds to select from robustly 
realist options. There is reason to want moral justification and vindication to be wholly 





62 Nietzsche is probably the canonical debunker of this sort. Anscombe (1958) is widely regarded as offering a 
debunking argument along similar lines. According to the common reading, Anscombe argues that because modern 
moral philosophy is inextricably bound up with a Christian, legalistic conception of the world, and modern thought 
is non-theistic, we moderns ought to abandon modern moral philosophy for a tradition continuous with pre-
Christian conceptions, especially ancient virtue ethics and an attendant moral psychology. However, because 
Anscombe was a devout Catholic who philosophized as such and in fact doubted the prospects of virtue ethics, this 
almost certainly is not the correct reading. Here I agree with Driver (2011), who reads Anscombe as offering “a 
modus tollens argument intended to establish the superiority of a religious based ethics.” See Mavrodes (1986) for a 
more explicit modus tollens in favor of a theistic ethic on the grounds of the necessity of theism for morality, in 
response to Mackie’s “queerness” argument. 
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§2.3 The inexpressible badness of quasi-realism 
At a high level of abstraction, anti-realist theories are theories that attempt to 
accommodate our moral discourse and practice without the characteristic metaphysical 
commitments of realism, that is, without commitments to a realistic construal of moral facts, 
properties, truths, and the like. The radical independence of moral truth, accommodated only by 
realism, can play a role in establishing an evaluative difference between realism and anti-realism 
partly because it amounts to a kind of independence that the standard-issue anti-realist explicitly 
denies, despite allowing for their own kind of degreed independence. 
Things are not so easy with the quasi-realist, and this section seeks to explain (or mostly 
to kvetch about) why. Like the standard-issue anti-realist, the quasi-realist attempts to 
accommodate our moral discourse and practice without the characteristic metaphysical 
commitments of realism. Although the point is rarely noted, this very fact suggests that whatever 
goes for pro-realism vis-à-vis its metaphysical differences with standard-issue anti-realism should 
in turn apply to its differences with quasi-realism. But there is one crucial difference: the quasi-
realist is an accommodationist in the extreme, seeking to, as a common boast goes, say anything 
that the realist can say. Anything? Yes––including statements that emit the strong aroma of 
realism, for example, “It is a response-independent, objective fact that torturing for its own sake 
is wrong.” Notoriously, if this project succeeds, then realists are precluded from identifying 
anything in the first-, second, or nth-order moral domain that distinguishes them from quasi-
realists. And if we cannot distinguish realism from quasi-realism descriptively, it seems that we 
cannot say what distinguishes it evaluatively.63 If there is no way to say how realism would be 
																																																								
63 With respect to quasi-realists themselves, things did not always look so bleak. In 1973 Blackburn defined “moral 
realism” as the view that “the truth of a moral utterances … consist[s] in their correspondence with some fact or 
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different from quasi-realism, then there is certainly no way to say why it would be better.64 Due to 
quasi-realism’s reliance on the minimalist notion of truth, according to which predicating truth 
of a proposition adds nothing to the assertion of the proposition itself, the problem has become 
known as “the problem of creeping minimalism.”65 The difficulty, in brief, is that if the anti-
realist adopts a minimalist conception of truth that avoids identifying truth with what Crispin 
Wright calls “a property of intrinsic metaphysical gravitas,”66 then all of the sorts of truth-claims 
that otherwise distinguish the realist from the anti-realist can no longer do their work.67 
While there is not room here to delve too far into this well-trodden territory, I will raise a 
suspicion about the state of the dialectic between quasi-realism and realism. This will in turn 
shed light on what pro-realists should say about quasi-realism––or more to the point, what they 
should say about not being able to say much at all.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
state of affairs”, and he even declared it “false” (102). But by the 1980s, things went dramatically downhill (for the 
purposes of defining realism) with the increasing popularity of the minimalist theory of truth. See, for example, the 
struggles of Wright (1988). 
 
64 Combined with the point just made about metaphysical differences with anti-realism, we are left in a somewhat 
paradoxical position. Given that quasi-realism adds nothing metaphysically to anti-realism, and that realism is 
certainly metaphysically different from anti-realism, it seems that there must be some difference––we just cannot say 
what it is. 
 
65 See Dreier (2004) for the classic contemporary statement of the problem. Dreier laments that “It’s not as if one side 
had better be able to come up with something clever to say about how to distinguish realism from [quasi-realism] or 
else the other side wins. It’s rather that those of us who feel confident that there is some difference between the two 
meta-ethical camps should be concerned that we don’t know how to say what that difference is” (31). My argument 
in this section says that we have reason to be unconcerned that we don’t know how to say what the difference is. 
 
66 Wright (1995: 213). 
 
67 Many metaethicists take the problem of creeping minimalism to be a problem for quasi-realists rather than 
realists. The thought is that, once quasi-realists adopt the minimalist program, it is they who have no way of 
explaining why they are not full-fledged realists. If that is right, then there is little sense in a pro-realist being worried 
about the truth of quasi-realism, since quasi-realism is just realism. What follows in the main text can be read as 
pursuing the other horn of an implicit dilemma––the possibility that the problem of creeping minimalism is really a 
problem for realists, that it is they who have no way of explaining what they add to quasi-realism. But if one thinks 
that quasi-realists have no way of showing that they are not realists, then so much the better for pro-realism. 
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The suspicious fact is that what makes quasi-realism and realism allegedly metaphysically 
indistinguishable is a purely semantic maneuver––namely, the adoption of expressivism at every 
level of moral discourse.68 But such a maneuver only works if reality is always exhausted by what 
we are able to say in any particular dialectical context. To illustrate, imagine two figures: a 
conventional moral realist and an anti-realist who is expressivist about only first-order moral 
discourse. (The early emotivists can, without too much interpretative harm, be thought of in this 
way.) Both the conventional realist and first-order expressivist may agree in asserting any 
number of first-order moral sentences, for example, “Torturing for its own sake is morally 
wrong.” However, they can also agree that the underlying metaphysic for each theory is different. 
Accordingly, they may disagree about various meta-moral, metaphysical sentences, for example, 
“The fact that torturing innocent uncles for fun is wrong is an objective, mind-independent fact in 
all possible worlds.” They can then point to the object of the disagreement––the nature of moral 
facts––and ask whether it would be better for such facts to be realistic or anti-realistic. Notice, 
too, that the first-order expressivist can, consistently with his own semantics, acknowledge that 
the kind of realistic independence highlighted in the previous section is not countenanced in his 
theory. He may even lament that fact. 
But suppose that the first-order expressivist has an unusual conversion: he comes to 
endorse expressivism at all levels of discourse about the moral: he becomes a pan-expressivist. 
What becomes of the previous disagreement over the sentence, “[T]he fact that torturing 
innocent uncles for fun is wrong is an objective, mind-independent fact in all possible worlds”? 
Merely by changing his semantics (while doing nothing to his metaphysics), the pan-expressivist 
																																																								
68 Here I am departing somewhat from the literature in identifying what we might call a problem of creeping 
expressivism rather than creeping minimalism. 
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now putatively agrees with the realist. Moreover, he can taunt the realist as follows: “You realists 
claim to be endorsing something above and beyond what we anti-realists endorse––but what?” 
This challenge––“but what?”––is unanswerable in the dialectical context, since there is no 
expressible “what” for which the pan-expressivist cannot give an expressivist reading. And so he 
may also taunt the pro-moral realist, “You can’t tell me what the difference is between our 
realism and quasi-realism, so why are you so angsty about it?” 
What has the pan-expressivist done, dialectically speaking? I submit that he has simply 
taken away the realist’s license to make distinctly realistic assertions––but only in the context of 
confronting pan-expressivism. Unfortunately, if the realist cannot make such assertions, then the 
pro-realist cannot go on to say, in light of some expressible difference, that it is better if realism is 
true, even if it is! But notice, crucially, that there is no good reason to think that the limits on 
what can be appropriately said are likewise limits on what the world is like. Hence, the realist is 
pushed––coerced, really––into a narrow, involuntary mysticism. By “mysticism” I just mean any 
position that says there are truths that we are unable to express.69 Such mysticism is narrow, 
because the pro-realist is coerced into it only when engaging a pan-expressivist. It is involuntary, 
because there are no commitments or independent considerations on the side of the pro-realist 
that force or even so much as motivate it. For example, there need be no explicit thought, 
characteristic of independently motivated mysticism, that reality outstrips our expressive 
capacities, though such a view is very well-motivated.70 For these reasons, in the dialectical 
context of contrasting realism with quasi-realism, the pro-realist is coerced into going mystical 
																																																								
69 This is a much thinner notion of mysticism than one finds in, for example, the canonical discussion by William 
James, Varieties, 281-283. 
 
70 For examples of mysticism that is independently motivated in this sense, see Thomas Hofweber (ms), “Are there 
Completely Ineffable Aspects of Reality?”; Fodor’s (1983:120ff.) discussion of “epistemic bounded[ness]”; McGinn 
(1989); and Chomsky (1988: 151-152). 
 
 71 
about both the difference between realism and quasi-realism, and therefore any evaluative 
judgment about that difference. 
While the fate of the pro-realist at the hands of the quasi-realist is a philosophical 
injustice, the injustice is clear enough that one need not despair. To show that the pro-realist’s 
predicament lacks any metaphysical interest whatsoever, I will consider (and close with) three 
otherwise distant topics, where there are debates (either actual or merely possible) with 
surprisingly similar structural aspects: Berkeleyan immaterialism, theism, and the metaphysics of 
consciousness. In each of these debates, the pro-realist can find innocent companions in coerced 
mysticism, each of them falling victim to either a pan-expressivist gambit or something similar to 
it. Yet, in each case, it seems reasonable for the pro-realist’s counterpart to remain likewise 
angsty, despite being robbed of expressive power. On this basis, the pro- realist may remain 
confident that it is better if realism rather than quasi-realism is true, even if the realist lacks the 
dialectical license to say it to the quasi-realist’s face. 
§2.3.1 Berkeleyan immaterialism 
According to Berkeleyan immaterialism (henceforth just immaterialism), mental 
substance is the only kind of substance. A common misconception has it that there are no 
external or physical objects of any kind according to this view, indeed no physical world at all. 
But immaterialism really just says something about such objects and the world––at the 
fundamental level, these are mentally constituted, and there is no need for an additional technical 
notion of physical substance. There are physical objects, but not in the kind of deep metaphysical 
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sense posited by materialism. The ordinary category “physical” is just one of many kinds of 
ultimately mental substance.71 
Immaterialism provides an illuminating surrogate for sophisticated quasi-realist positions 
in metaethics. What Berkeley accommodates vis-à-vis materialism and dualism, quasi-realists 
accommodate vis-à-vis moral realism. Berkeley can say anything that the materialist or dualist 
can say. Sentences like, “There are minds and bodies,” “Some objects are physical,” “There are 
objects other than minds,” etc., are welcomed by the immaterialist. Yet these are just the 
sentences that one might have hoped would distinguish theses like substance dualism from its 
rivals! Crucially, Berkeley himself denies appeals to the materialist’s technical notion of material 
substance; indeed, he denies that the notion is even intelligible. Likewise, the moral quasi-realist 
may deny the realist’s technical notion of realistically construed, robust moral properties; indeed, 
quasi-realists commonly deny that such notions are even intelligible. But, with a gambit of the 
pan-expressivist sort, there would be no need for the immaterialist to even deny talk of “material 
substance,” provided it can be given an immaterialist reading. 
That we are all mental substances ultimately existing as ideas in the mind of God is not an 
evaluatively idle idea; it is something one might appropriately want not to be true. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to explain what is so bad about this prospect to an immaterialist who can agree 
with any sentences uttered by the materialist or dualist. Yet, who thinks that there really is no 
difference––both descriptively and evaluatively––between the truth of materialism and 
immaterialism? Those of us who are either uncommitted to either view, or committed 
immaterialists with a semantics that can express materialism, or committed materialists, can 
																																																								
71 “[C]ollections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things – which as they are pleasing or 
disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth” (Berkeley, Of the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, 1.1, emphasis mine). 
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express perfectly well what is lacking on immaterialism: the material world. Yet, we are simply 
robbed of the dialectical license to offer such a sentence in the context of arguing with an 
immaterialist who offers some kind of pan-immaterialist semantic program. 
§2.3.2 Theism 
Consider a much more familiar source of angst: God. Worries about God are more likely 
to induce philosophical angst than immaterialism. This is not a coincidence: while the alleged 
badness of naturalistic religion may bear formal analogies to the alleged badness of 
immaterialism, religion often plays a central and existentially important a role in human life 
more akin to moral value.72 
Although debates between traditional theists and atheists are most familiar to 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike, there is also a dispute between supernaturalist religion 
(henceforth, supernaturalism) and naturalist religion (henceforth, naturalism). Naturalists deny 
supernaturalist metaphysics, but seek to provide a positive account of religious discourse and 
practice.73 Provided that something natural can play the role of the supernaturalist God, the 
naturalist may give naturalistic readings of various kinds of religious propositions––for example, 
that God exists or that God loves us. But even if the naturalist succeeds at this project of 
accommodating first-order religious discourse and practice, it is manifest both that naturalists 
and supernaturalists differ at the level of metaphysics, and that this has significant evaluative 
upshot. As long as the naturalist remains a second-order descriptivist, the supernaturalist and 
naturalist can agree that their metaphysics at the first-order level are different. 
																																																								
72 Much of this, I suspect, has to do with what I say regarding “crypto-theism” above. 
 
73 See especially Johnston (2009) and Dworkin (2013). 
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But the naturalist may decide to play dirty. If he adopts a religious semantics in which all 
first-, second-, and nth-order religious discourse can come out true even without the truth of 
traditional theism, then the supernaturalist is robbed of his dialectical license to offer any first-, 
second-, or nth-order religious sentences that would otherwise distinguish the two theorists’ 
metaphysics. 
That there is no God in the traditional sense is not just an evaluatively indifferent idea; it 
is something one might intelligibly want not to be true. But it is impossible to appropriately 
explain what is so bad about this prospect to a naturalist who can agree with any sentences 
uttered by the supernaturalist. Yet, who thinks that there really is no difference––both 
descriptively and evaluatively––between the truth of supernaturalism and naturalism? Those of 
us who are either uncommitted to either view, or committed naturalists with a semantics that can 
express supernaturalism, or committed supernaturalists, can express perfectly well what is 
lacking on naturalism: God. Yet, we are simply robbed of the dialectical license to offer such a 
sentence in the context of arguing with a naturalist who offers some kind of pan-naturalist 
semantic program. 
§2.3.3 Consciousness 
Finally, consider a slightly less familiar source of angst from a still-familiar topic: 
consciousness. Consciousness does induce philosophical angst, though perhaps not as much as 
naturalism or anti-realism. But it does, in many people’s conceptual schemes, play an important 
role. For example, according to many philosophers, consciousness marks much of what is most 
valuable in the universe. A world of metaphysical zombies would be a much worse world than 
ours, at least with respect to the value contributed by consciousness itself. 
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Imagine a philosopher named “David.” David believes that, in addition to physical stuff 
in the world, there is mental stuff, in particular, there is consciousness. Moreover, David thinks 
that, even if we cannot quite say what consciousness is in non-mental terms, we all (provided we 
are conscious) more or less have access to the fact of its existence. 
David disagrees with Phillip, who believes that there is no such thing as consciousness. 
Not only that, but they disagree over what they agree is a single proposition: that there is 
consciousness. It is dialectically appropriate for David to say to Phillip, “My view is different from 
yours, because my view posits consciousness.” This expressible descriptive difference allows them 
to maintain an evaluative dispute about whether it is better or worse for there to be consciousness 
in the world. Hence it is also dialectically appropriate for David to say to Phillip, “It would be 
better if my view were true, because only my view accommodates the irreplaceable, important 
good that is consciousness.” 
But now Phillip calls over his cousin, Daniel. Helpfully for our purposes, Daniel adopts a 
semantics in which all first-, second-, and nth-order discourse about the mental can come out 
true even without the existence of consciousness in David’s sense. Hence, David is robbed of his 
dialectical license to offer any first-, second-, or nth-order sentences that would otherwise 
distinguish his metaphysics from Daniel’s. David can, of course, turn to Phillip and rightly say, 
“You and I both know that Daniel doesn’t really believe in consciousness,” but such a sentence 
cannot appropriately be offered to Daniel himself. 
What the above three examples––material objects, God, and consciousness–––show is 
that it is possible for an interlocutor to adopt a semantic or related program that takes away 
another interlocutor’s dialectical license to appropriately offer any first-, second-, … or nth-order 
sentences in the relevant domain in order to distinguish the metaphysics of the two theories. 
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Consequently, it becomes impossible to give a descriptive account of what makes one angsty in 
the domain. After all, one cannot intelligibly evaluate what one cannot identify in the first place. 
Hence, the pro-realist is not the only sort of person coerced into what I have called involuntary 
mysticism. There are companions in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, 
and elsewhere. 
What should we conclude from this, vis-à-vis the truth of pro-realism? Although the pro-
realist is prevented from appropriately defending the claim that it would be worse if quasi-realism 
were true in the narrow dialectical context of engaging an actual quasi-realist, the assertion 
should be maintained in every other context. There are no good reasons for thinking that what 
goes for realism versus anti-realism generally, does not also go for realism versus quasi-realism. 
There are only good reasons to think that the pro-realist lacks the dialectical license to say so to 
the quasi-realist. As we have seen, the pan-expressivist gambit of the quasi-realist makes no 
metaphysical difference to the distinction between realism and non-quasi anti-realism; hence it 
must also make no evaluative difference. So, just as the realistic independence of moral 
vindication justifies the hope that realism rather than anti-realism is true, so it justifies the hope 
that realism rather than quasi-realism is true. This much, at least, we can affirm when the quasi-
realist is not in the room. 
§3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have commended the research program of angsty metaethics and the 
exploration of metaethical value judgments. To this end, I defended the claim that it is much 




Chapter 4: Preferring Moral Antirealism 
 
 
Although some philosophers hope that moral realism is true, some (perhaps most) are apathetic: 
they do not think that anything of normative significance hinges on which metaethical theory is 
true––provided that one of them other than nihilism pans out. After all, normative theory is one 
thing, metaethics another, and it is normative theory that is responsible for telling us what is 
normatively significant. But a third position is neither hopeful nor apathetic. Some philosophers 
think that it is bad if moral realism is true, or have at least given arguments that suggest as much. 
In this chapter I develop a taxonomy of such perspectives and identify an underlying concern 
that they share. While I conclude that the arguments for hoping against moral realism are not 
cogent, the reasons for this conclusion are instructive for better understanding the relationship 
between normative and metaethics. 
 In brief, I distinguish between two forms of what I call anti-moral realism. Anti-moral 
realism is the position that there is something bad about moral realism in particular that does not 
extend to moral thought generally. Anti-moral realism divides into opposition in-principle and 
in-practice. According to the in-principle opposition, the truth of moral realism is intrinsically 
worse than its anti-realist alternatives, because something about morality itself would be worse if 
moral realism were true. According to the in-practice opposition, endorsement of moral realism 
is worse than endorsement of its anti-realist alternatives. According to this perspective, even if 
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moral realism is true, we should still not care about or endorse it. After showing that these 
arguments share a general underlying concern and structure, I respond to them. 
§1 Anti-Moral Realism 
§1.1 Killoren’s argument: the unimportance of a realistic morality 
 The first argument that I will consider is narrowly targeted toward a particular brand of 
moral realism. This argument is found in David Killoren’s (2016) objection to Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau’s (2014) version of non-naturalism. I will show how Killoren’s argument can be 
generalized to apply to many forms of moral realism––at least, all non-naturalistic forms. Then, I 
will explicate another objection to moral realism and show how it shares an underlying concern 
and structure with the generalized form of Killoren’s objection. 
For the purposes of understanding Killoren’s objection, the crucial thing to know about 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view is that, according to them, moral truths obtain in virtue of 
conceptual truths. Consider a putative moral truth, for example, It is morally wrong to 
recreationally slaughter a fellow person. According to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, this truth 
obtains in virtue of the relationships between its constitutive concepts (at least one of which, 
<morally wrong>, is a non-natural concept). Killoren argues that such a view precludes our 
having any reason to care about morality per se. Here is the argument: 
1. Conceptual truths are normatively irrelevant. 
2. According to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, moral truths obtain in virtue of conceptual truths. 
3. If X is normatively irrelevant, and Y obtains in virtue of X, then Y is normatively irrelevant. (Killoren’s 
“Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission”) 
Therefore, 
4. If Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are correct, then moral truths are normatively irrelevant.74 
 
																																																								
74 Following the argument structure of Killoren on p. 171. 
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I will not be concerned here to defend Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s particular brand of non-
naturalism, except to make one critical comment. The Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission is 
fairly dubious. For one thing, it is open to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau to accept the alternative 
Principle of Relevancy Transmission: If Y is normatively relevant, and Y obtains in virtue of X, then X is 
normatively relevant. 
 
A non-naturalist who accepts the Principle of Relevancy Transmission rationally may regard it as 
a substantive discovery that conceptual truths are normatively relevant. The Principle of 
Relevancy Transmission is not obviously less plausible than the Principle of Irrelevancy 
Transmission, so a stalemate looms. 
But I want to set such concerns aside and consider a more general––and simpler––form 
of Killoren’s argument that does not rely on the contentious Principle of Irrelevancy 
Transmission. Consider the following: 
1. Non-natural truths are normatively irrelevant. 
2. According to non-naturalistic moral realism, moral truths are non-natural truths. 
Therefore, 
3. If moral realism is true, then moral truths are normatively irrelevant. 
 
Call this the “Irrelevancy Argument”. The Irrelevancy Argument is more general than Killoren’s 
argument, because it threatens all forms of non-naturalism that identify moral truths with non-
natural truths.  
More importantly for our purposes, while the Irrelevancy Argument may be deployed in 
defending the falsity of non-naturalistic moral realism, it may also be deployed in defending the 
badness of non-naturalistic moral realism (henceforth, non-naturalism). After all, it seems that it 
would be very bad if moral truths were normatively irrelevant. Although it is usually taken as an 
argument against the truth of moral realism, the result that moral truths are normatively 
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irrelevant is not in fact incompatible with realism. Rather than think non-naturalism is false, one 
might end up thinking that it is “sad but true.”75 
 It is easy to build on the Irrelevancy Argument and develop a somewhat more 
complicated argument that explicitly gives us a reason to prefer that anti-realism rather than 
realism is true. There are many ways to accomplish this, but here is a fairly intuitive option: 
1. If moral realism is true, then moral truths are normatively irrelevant. 
2. If moral anti-realism is true, then moral truths are normatively relevant. 
3. Any view according to which moral truths are normatively relevant is, in that respect, preferable to a view 
according to which moral truths are normatively irrelevant. 
Therefore, 
4. There is some reason to prefer that moral anti-realism rather than realism is true. 
Call this the Relevancy Argument. The Relevancy Argument does not settle the question of 
which theory we should prefer, all things considered, but it offers considerable progress in 
answering that question in favor of anti-realism.  
Notice how easy it is to defend premise 2. The Irrelevancy Argument was plausible largely 
because it is difficult to see how non-natural truths are normatively relevant. But it is not hard to 
see how natural truths are normatively relevant––at least, the sort of natural truths that appear in 
anti-realist theories. Here are some putative natural truths that appear in anti-realist theories: 
• We are deeply opposed to the recreational slaughter of human beings. 
• Idealized, fully-informed versions of our selves would disapprove of the recreational slaughter of human 
beings. 
• Recreational slaughter of human beings is at odds with our deepest cares, commitments, plans, values, and 
desires. 
• Recreational slaughter is an action deeply at odds with evolutionarily determined conditions in which 
human beings flourish. 
 
This list is certainly not exhaustive, but it is representative of the sorts of facts that play a central 
role in anti-realist theories of moral truth and value. Whatever doubts one has about the truth of 
																																																								
75 This is how Kate Manne (2014) describes her own internalist account of reasons, though her reasons for doing so 
are a bit less dramatic  
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anti-realist theories, it would be extraordinarily difficult to argue that they ground moral truth in 
something that is normatively irrelevant. 
 Killoren’s argument, and the more generalized versions of it, are “in-principle” objections 
because they argue that something about morality itself is worse if realism rather than anti-
realism is true. The next argument has a different structure, though I will show that the 
underlying concern is the same. 
§1.2 Erdur’s argument: the forbidden commitments of a realistic morality 
 The second argument that I will consider is more ambitious than Killoren’s original 
objection to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. Melis Erdur argues that moral realism “makes the 
wrongness of anything always conditional on the existence of a dictate of some independent 
reality,” and, therefore, commits realists to trying to follow these dictates whatever they may be. 
But, says Erdur, this commitment is itself immoral. 
[S]urely, the existence of an independently issued verdict––if there were such a verdict––that genocide is 
wrong would not be the main or ultimate reason why it is wrong. Genocide is wrong mainly and ultimately 
because of the pain and suffering and loss that it involves––regardless of whether or not the badness of such 
suffering and loss is confirmed by an independent reality. The mistake in realism, therefore, is that it holds 
independence from our judgments in such high regard that everything else, including what really makes 
things right or wrong, diminishes in importance.76 
 
This objection to realism is meant to be isomorphic to a common realist objection to anti-
realism: that the anti-realist makes moral truth objectionably dependent upon our responses.77 
Consider a toy version of anti-realism, say, a view according to which what is morally right and 
wrong is a simple function of what most people support and oppose, respectively. On this view, 
all it would take for lighting innocent uncles on fire for fun to become permissible is that most 
																																																								
76 Erdur (2016: 597-598, emphasis original). 
 
77 For a prominent characterization of moral anti-realism in terms of the response-dependence of moral truth, see 
Sharon Street (2016). 
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people come to support such an action. It is natural to object to this by saying that, surely, the 
action would be wrong even if most people support it. Normally this is understood to be evidence 
that the view in question is false. But to complete the parallel to Erdur’s concern, we might argue 
further that it is immoral to conditionalize one’s opposition to the action on the majority 
opinion. 
 To get a better sense of the force of Erdur’s objection, consider another unsophisticated 
version of a metaethical theory, but this time a realist one: a voluntaristic version of Divine 
Command Theory according to which our moral obligations are identical to whatever God 
happens to command, where there are no independent constraints on what these commands 
might be.78 Divine command theorists of this sort are committed to doing horrible things if God 
commands them, including but not limited to lighting innocent uncles on fire for fun. It is 
natural to morally balk at this theory on the grounds that one ought not do certain things even if 
God commands them. One might think that there is something not just theoretically implausible, 
but morally pernicious about a theory that commits us to lighting innocent uncles on fire for fun 
just because God says to do so. 
 In Erdur’s view, the same point goes for moral realism. Just as the voluntaristic divine 
command theorist is immorally committed to whatever behavior God happens to command, the 
standard-issue moral realist is immorally committed to whatever behavior independent moral 
reality happens to dictate. Just as you might think that one ought not do certain things even if 
God commands them, Erdur thinks you ought not do certain things even if they are dictated by 
an independent moral reality. Erdur’s argument is notable partly because it issues a moral 
																																																								
78 Sophisticated versions of Divine Command Theory, for example, Robert Adams’ (1987) “modified” version in 
which moral obligations are the commands of a loving God, are immune from what follows. 
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challenge not to moral realism per se, but to moral realists themselves, qua moral agents. She 
intends her argument to be cogent even if moral realism is true. Here is one of several ways of 
putting Erdur’s argument into slightly more formal terms: 
1. Moral realism commits moral realists to doing whatever an independent moral reality dictates. 
2. It is immoral to be committed to doing whatever an independent moral reality dictates. 
Therefore, 
3. Moral realism commits moral realists to doing something immoral. 
 
Call the “The Immorality Argument.” Erdur’s own conclusion is stronger than The Immorality 
Argument, in that she thinks one morally ought not be a moral realist. As far the above 
formulation says, there may be overriding moral reasons to be a moral realist that defeat the 
immorality partly constitutive of being one. But, with the exception of exotic situations in which 
being a moral realist is an option within a genuine moral dilemma (“Become a moral realist, or 
I’ll light this innocent uncle on fire!”), this formulation is close enough to the conclusion that 
Erdur wants. Notice that, like Killoren’s argument, Erdur’s is consistent with moral realism being 
true. Just as Killoren’s argument might make one think that realism is “sad but true,” one might 
be inspired by Erdur to think the same about the immorality of being a moral realist. 
 Before proceeding further, it is important to remember that I am not engaged in Erdurian 
exegesis. Erdur herself thinks that this kind of objection applies just as much to anti-realists as it 
does realists. The problem is just that realists have typically thought that they were immune to an 
objection that they happily lobbed at anti-realists. She defends a metaphysically quietist 
conclusion: one ought not ground morality in anything. So, it would not be consonant with the 
spirit of Erdur’s argument to interpret it as a reason to prefer anti-realism to realism. But Erdur’s 
qualms about moral metaphysics in general do not prevent us from considering The Immorality 
Argument in isolation, as a potential reason to prefer moral anti-realism to realism. 
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 For those who worry that there really is parity between realism and anti-realism in just 
the way that Erdur suggests, there is some reason to think that anti-realist commitment is at least 
less immoral than realist commitment. In an unpublished manuscript, “Immoral Realism,” Max 
Hayward argues that anti-realists are committed to abandoning morality only for good reasons, 
whereas non-naturalist realists must be committed to abandoning morality for bad reasons. Here 
is an extended excerpt from Hayward that makes the point well. His example of a moral 
commitment is the commitment to be faithful to one’s partner. 
For a naturalist, we may be entirely wrong about what matters if there is no external natural world, or if we 
are greatly mistaken about its contents. Certain kinds of judgement dependence theorists conditionalise 
morality on what people want or will; if they become sceptics about other minds, they may then become 
moral sceptics. But these strike me as perfectly good reasons to suspend our commitment to morality. We all 
think that if there is no external world, or there are no other minds then nothing will matter morally (or 
what matters may be radically different). On the other hand, whether or not naturalism is true would make 
no causal difference to the world that we––and those we have moral relations with––live in. All our 
perceptual and empirical beliefs, all our inferences based on experience, could be correct, and naturalism 
still be true (or false). There might be no non-natural moral truths, and yet the rest of our beliefs about the 
world, and about the desires and attitudes of my partner and the commitments I have made to her, could all 
be correct. If I were to drop my commitment to my partner, but every aspect of our history, every aspect of 
her feelings and concerns stayed the same, that, I think, would constitute as deep a betrayal to her as 
abandoning my commitment because the Mets lost or because God is dead. … It would be a betrayal to our 
fellow agents if we abandoned our commitment to them just because we decided that the natural world is 
all there is. Even if we never made these discoveries––never concluded that God is dead, that the Mets have 
lost, or that naturalist is true––simply being prepared to abandon moral commitment should that situation 
come to pass, or thinking that there would be nothing wrong in so doing, is itself objectionable, is itself a 
kind of betrayal. We ought not to conditionalise our moral commitments on any of these things.79 
 
So, Hayward thinks there is a principled difference between (non-naturalist) realism and anti-
realism vis-à-vis morally permissible conditionalization: realism grounds morality in something 
that makes no causal difference to the world, whereas anti-realism grounds morality in things 
that do make a causal difference. It is, in principle, permissible to conditionalize moral 
commitments on things that make a causal difference to the world, but it is, in principle, 
impermissible to conditionalize moral commitments on things that make no causal difference to 
																																																								
79 Hayward (ms: pp. 13-14) 
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the world. Hayward’s point provides a nice supplement to Erdur’s argument in that it gives some 
reason to think that there is not the parity between realism and anti-realism that Erdur claims. 
§1.3 Anti-moral realism and the “normative question” 
 The Irrelevancy, Relevancy, and Immorality Arguments each share an underlying 
concern, even though they strictly speaking have different targets. The Irrelevancy Argument, 
recall, concludes that moral realism entails that moral truths are normatively irrelevant. The 
Relevancy argument concludes that, because anti-realism preserves the normative relevance of 
moral truths, it is in that respect preferable to realism. And the Immorality argument concludes 
that being a moral realist involves immorally conditionalizing one’s moral beliefs on the dictates 
of an independent reality. 
 Each of these arguments relies on the idea that moral realism (and non-naturalist moral 
realism, in particular) provides normatively inadequate grounds for morality. Normally these 
arguments are marshaled in favor of the falsity of moral realism, but I have shown that they need 
not be. The alleged inadequacy of realist grounds has a range of deleterious results, from the 
unimportance of moral reality itself to the badness of basing one’s moral commitments on 
anything that moral reality happens to say. So, the underlying idea of these arguments gives us a 
reason that someone might have for thinking it would be bad if realism were true, and preferring 
or hoping for anti-realism on that basis. 
The kinds of arguments surveyed here are reminiscent of some critical remarks about 
realism made by Christine Korsgaard (1996). Korsgaard defines realism as the view that “moral 
claims are normative if they are true, and true if there are intrinsically normative entities or facts 
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which they correctly describe.”80 Later, “Obligation is simply there, part of the nature of things. 
We must suppose certain actions to be obligatory in themselves if anything is.”81 Korsgaard says 
that realism so understood “refuses to answer to the normative question,” viz. the question of 
“what justifies the claims that morality makes on us”.82 
The thought behind Korsgaard’s critique of realism is that realists are committed to 
saying that we ought to obey the claims of morality simply because it is a fact that we ought to. 
But because it was this very fact that we were asking after in the first place, Korsgaard argues, the 
realist’s reply is more of a stubborn repetition than an answer to the normative question. And if 
realism lacks an answer to the normative question, then it turns out that realism gives us little 
reason to care about the demands of morality. 
There is a deep connection between Korsgaard’s worry and the arguments of Killoren and 
Erdur that I first summarized, and then generalized, above. It is hopefully not too much of an 
interpretative stretch to say that Killoren and Erdur help to make concrete the objection that 
Korsgaard offers more abstractly. Killoren and Erdur help to show how and why realism fails to 
answer the normative question (or something like it) and, moreover, what is morally wrong with 
taking it to do so. 
Recall the generalized version of Killoren’s argument (the Relevancy Argument): 
1. If moral realism is true, then moral truths are normatively irrelevant. 
2. If moral anti-realism is true, then moral truths are normatively relevant. 
3. Any view according to which moral truths are normatively relevant is, in that respect, preferable to a view 
according to which moral truths are normatively irrelevant. 
Therefore, 
4. There is some reason to prefer that moral anti-realism rather than realism is true. 
																																																								
80 Korsgaard (1996, 19). 
 
81 Ibid., 30. 
 
82 Ibid., 40, 9 (emphasis original). 
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Premise 1 is a way of saying that moral realism fails to answer Korsgaard’s normative question. 
After all, if realism did answer the normative question, then it could not be that moral truths are 
normatively irrelevant. If this is right, then premise 3 can be read as saying that metaethical 
theories that answer the normative question are, in that respect, preferable to theories that don’t. 
 Now recall the formalization of Erdur’s argument: 
1. Moral realism commits moral realists to doing whatever an independent moral reality dictates. 
2. It is immoral to be committed to doing whatever an independent moral reality dictates. 
Therefore, 
3. Moral realism commits moral realists to doing something immoral. 
 
This argument is more distant from Korsgaard’s concerns, but it still bears a significant and 
illuminating connection to it. Suppose we ask why it is immoral to be committed to doing 
whatever an independent morality dictates. The answer must be that there is no good reason to 
grant an independent reality the relevant kind of authority over one’s actions. But this is just a 
way of saying that positing an independent moral reality does nothing to answer the normative 
question. If independent moral reality were a sufficient basis for answering the normative 
question, then it would no longer seem immoral to conditionalize one’s moral commitments 
upon its dictates. If these connections are right, then Erdur’s argument is a way of drawing 
something out of Korsgaard’s concerns that is of distinctly moral significance to metaethicists 
themselves: it is immoral to adhere to a theory that fails to answer the normative question. 
§2 Responding to anti-moral realism 
 I am what I call a pro-realist. That is to say, I think it would be better if moral realism 
were true, rather than its alternatives. So, I have an interest in responding to the above suite of 
arguments. To that end, I will argue that each of the above arguments elides the distinction 
between normative and metaethics, albeit in subtle ways. When this distinction is clarified and 




 First, Killoren. Recall Killoren’s Irrelevancy Argument, central to which was the Principle 
of Irrelevancy Transmission: 
Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission: If X is normatively irrelevant, and Y obtains in virtue of X, then Y 
is normatively irrelevant. 
 
Killoren motivates the Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission itself partly by appealing to the 
example of cultural relativism. He points out that the cultural relativist may give the following 
unconvincing reason for why recreational slaughter of persons is wrong: “Our society is such that 
recreational slaughter of a fellow person is condemned by our society’s generally accepted moral 
standards” (171). Yet, says, Killoren, “the mere fact that our society happens to generally accept a 
standard that forbids a given action does not seem, on its own, to provide any reason to refrain 
from performing that action.” Hence, the relativist’s reason fails to explain why recreational 
slaughter is really wrong, and in fact undermines that claim. This failure is itself evidence for the 
Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission, because the principle nicely explains why the normative 
irrelevance of what our society happens to accept in turn seems to undermine the claim that we 
have reason not to engage in recreational slaughter. 
While I concede that this example makes some version of the principle plausible, at the 
same time it casts doubt on whether the plausible version is relevant to metaethics. The example 
makes salient something fishy about the relationship between the principle and grounding 
projects in metaethics more generally. As described by Killoren, cultural relativism is a position 
in normative moral theory, in which grounding projects seek precisely to identify the general 
normative grounds for true moral propositions. But grounding projects in metaethics are 
engaged in something different from grounding projects in metaethics. Some normative fact, N, 
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may be normatively grounded in some further fact, X, yet be metaphysically grounded in another 
fact, Y. Consider the following claim that, let us suppose, is true right now: you ought to clean 
your room. This truth may be grounded in the fact that your parents commanded you to clean 
your room, and that fact may be normatively relevant in virtue of some underlying fact about 
what is owed to parents. But none of this involves any metaethics––in particular, it does not 
involve any moral metaphysics. After all, imagine that someone asks for a justification for why 
they ought to clean their room. It is sensible to respond, “Because your parents told you to,” but 
quite ridiculous to respond, “Because it’s an irreducibly normative, non-natural conceptual truth 
that you ought to obey your parents.” The lesson here is that normative justification is not a 
species of metaphysical ground, and the Principle of Irrelevancy Transmission applies to the 
former and not the latter. 
Once we make the distinction between normative and metaphysical grounds, neither the 
Irrelevancy nor Relevancy Arguments are plausible. This is because all of them rely on the 
thought that the metaphysical grounds of moral truths are normatively irrelevant, whereas they 
would need to show that he normative grounds are normatively irrelevant. Concluding that 
morality is normatively irrelevant because its metaphysical grounds are normatively irrelevant is 
a bit like concluding that your Grandfather’s watch is insignificant because the metal substance 
in which it is grounded is insignificant. In fact, the watch’s significance is not determined by its 
metaphysical grounds. 
§2.2 Erdur 
Let us turn now to Erdur’s argument. Recall that Erdur thinks that moral realists are 
committed to conditionalizing their moral views on the dictates of an independent reality. This is 
because she thinks that a person’s metaethical view is the correct place to terminate a chain of 
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normative why-questions. To illustrate, consider the following exchange between Eleazar (a 
layperson) and Esther (a Kantian), which I have loosely adapted from pp. 593-594 of Erdur’s 
paper. 
Esther:  A’s killing of B was not wrong. 
Eleazar:  Why? 
Esther:  Because it was self-defense. 
Eleazar:  Why does the fact that A’s killing was self-defense count against its wrongness? 
Esther:  The fact that A’s killing of B was self-defense makes a moral difference because it makes a 
difference to the universalizability of A’s maxim––killing to save one’s own life passes the 
universalization test, whereas killing for another reason might have failed it. 
 
Suppose now that Eleazar is still unsatisfied. How might the exchange naturally proceed? Erdur 
imagines something like the following, in the case that Eleazar is not only a Kantian but a moral 
realist: 
Eleazar:  Why does the universalizability of a maxim render an action permissible? 
Esther:  Because an independent moral reality dictates that it does. 
 
Once a “why” question is asked about an abstract normative theory, the appropriate next step, 
according to Erdur, is to ascend to the level of metaethics. Metaethical theories, therefore, “may 
naturally be heard as very general substantive moral claims about why (in the end) right things 
are right and wrong things are wrong” (595). 
Given what I have said in response to Killoren, my response to Erdur should be 
unsurprising. There is something confused about answering a substantively moral why-question 
with a metaethical statement––and, especially, a metaphysical metaethical statement. 
Philosophical taxonomy itself casts doubt on metaethical answers to normative moral questions. 
After all, as I argued in the previous subsection, normative justification is one thing, 
metaphysical grounding another.  
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To see the broader point more concretely, it is useful to depart from moral philosophy for 
the moment. Consider the following exchange about physics between Newton and Moses, 
intended as a scientific parallel to the exchange imagined by Erdur: 
Newton:  X’s state of being at rest hasn’t changed. 
Moses:  Why? 
Newton:  Because it has not been impressed upon by any force. 
Moses:  Why does the fact that an object has not been impressed upon by any force make a 
different to its state of being at rest? 
Newton:  The fact that an object has not been impressed upon by any force makes a different to its 
state of rest because of the Law of Inertia––every body persists in its state of being at rest 
or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its 
state by force impressed. 
 
So far, so good. But suppose that Moses is still unsatisfied. How might the exchange naturally 
proceed? Here is what the analogue to Erdur’s ascent to metaethics would look like, if we think of 
Newton as a scientific realist: 
Moses:  Why does the Law of Inertia make any difference to whether an object is at rest? 
Newton:  Because an independent reality dictates that it does. 
 
It is immediately recognizable that Newton’s final answer is not informative as a piece of physics. 
If Newton is doing physics, then his final answer does not even so much as add anything to what 
he has said previously. As a sentence in physics, the statement that an independent reality 
dictates that the Law of Inertia makes a difference to whether an object is at rest is just a 
restatement that the Law of Inertia makes a different to whether an object is at rest.  
But Newton’s final answer is, or would be, informative as a piece of philosophy of science 
or, in particular, the metaphysics of physics. In such a context, we would think of his answer as a 
statement of scientific realism. (I am here conceiving of philosophy of science in relation to 
scientific discourse and practice as analogous in relevant ways to metaethics in relation to moral 
discourse and practice.) Unfortunately, in the present context, informativeness comes at the 
expense of relevance. Moses just wasn’t asking about whether scientific realism is true. 
 
 92 
All that being said, Newton’s final answer is relevant to other questions that Moses could 
have asked. Here is just one such question that is better-suited to Newton’s final answer: 
Moses:  When you say that the Law of Inertia makes a difference to whether an object is at rest, 
are you saying that there really is such a law, written into the fabric of the Universe, or is 
that just a construct that helps us carry on scientifically? 
 
Newton’s final answer is relevant to this question, because this question is located squarely in the 
domain of philosophy of science, and the metaphysics of physics in particular. 
The same analysis applies to the exchange between Esther and Eleazar. Esther’s final 
appeal to “an independent moral reality” adds nothing to the discussion if it is an answer to a 
question within normative ethics. Yet, “Why does the universalizability of a maxim render an 
action permissible?” is a question in normative ethics, and so Esther’s final answer about the 
dictates of an independent reality is either uninformative or irrelevant. If it is an answer in 
normative ethics, then it simply repeats what came before. If it is an answer in metaphysics, then 
it is irrelevant to Eleazar’s normative question. But we can change Eleazar’s question just as we 
changed Moses’ question. Here is a question better-suited to Esther’s final answer: 
Eleazar:  When you say that the universalizability of a maxim renders an action permissible, are 
you saying that there really is such a moral law, written into the fabric of the Universe, or 
is that just a construct that helps us carry on morally? 
 
Esther’s final answer is relevant to this question, because this question is located squarely in the 
domain of metaethics. 
Once we disambiguate normative from metaethical “why” questions (and their “because” 
answers), we should not accept Erdur’s claim that metaethics provides the termination point for 
chains of normative why-questions. And if we do not accept Erdur’s claim that metaethics 
provides the termination point for chains of normative why-questions, then we need not worry 
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about normative commitments being conditional on metaethical positions. Since this claim 
about commitment is essential the Immorality Argument, the argument fails. 
Before finishing this subsection, it is worth applying its lesson more concretely. 
According to Erdur, moral realists are committed to denying the following proposition (among 
infinitely many others): Genocide is wrong mainly and ultimately because of the pain and suffering 
and loss that it involves––regardless of whether or not the badness of such suffering and loss is 
confirmed by an independent reality. I have shown that there is an equivocation between the 
normative and metaethical “because.” As grounds for wrongness of genocide, pain and suffering 
are not competitors with the dictate of an independent reality. Rather, the realist view is that the 
ultimate normative grounds for the wrongness of genocide are to be understood metaphysically 
as constituted by an independent reality. It is not that the independent reality issues a further 
dictate beyond the proposition, Genocide is wrong because of the pain and suffering and loss that 
it involves. Rather, that dictate just is an independent reality. 
Erdur imagines that realists (and antirealists) have the second-order committed to give 
up their first-order moral commitments in the event that their metaphysics tells them to do so. 
Once we have rightly separated the roles of normative and metaethics, it is clear that this 
hypothetical is not plausible. Using Erdur’s terminology, the only “reality” that can tell us what to 
do is normative reality. Hence, as far as theories go, it is the best normative moral theory that 
should tell us what we morally ought to do. The best metaethical theory tells us the metaphysical, 
epistemology, semantic, and perhaps psychological status or nature of the best normative moral 
theory. 
If this is the right way to understand normative and metaethics, then the closest 
hypotheticals to Erdur’s will not––indeed, cannot––have the morally objectionable results that 
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she worries about. The only sense in which an “independent moral reality” can “dictate” 
something––say, that p is morally wrong––that opposes what we currently think is by 
constituting the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological underpinnings of the 
true normative theory’s dictation that p is morally wrong. But it is hardly morally objectionable to 
be committed to thinking that p is morally wrong in the event that p is morally wrong. 
§2.3 Korsgaard’s normative question––and Parfit’s principled non-answer 
 What goes for Killoren and Erdur goes also for Korsgaard’s normative question. We 
should not expect that metaethics will give us a normative reason to care about morality. Even 
though I do not think that metaethics is evaluatively or normatively idle, I do hold that it is idle 
in this particular sense.83 
Recall that Korsgaard thinks that the realist appeal to mere facts is insufficient to answer 
the normative question. This is because, “If it is just a fact that a certain action would be good, a 
fact that you might or might not apply to deliberation, then it seems to be an open question 
whether you should apply it” (317). In response, Derek Parfit found himself mystified that 
anyone could endorse a proposition like It is a fact that I ought to X and simultaneously wonder 
Why should I X? In response to Korsgaard, Parfit writes, “If it is a fact that you should do 
something, it is not an open question whether you should do it” (418). Parfit felt that, once you 
accept the fact that you ought to X, there is no further question for you about whether to X. 
Philosophers who claim that non-natural facts about what one ought to do are not necessarily 
normative struck Parfit as conceptually confused. I confess to deep sympathy with Parfit’s 
reaction to Korsgaard’s claim. If we know that it is a fact that I ought to X, then we know that the 
																																																								




true normative theory tells me to X. The normative grounds for why the true normative theory 
tells me to X may be open in an epistemic sense––for example, I may not know what they are––
but this is not a failing that can be pinned on the realist. 
In explicating this point, it helps to emphasize the difference between the thing in virtue 
of which a claim is true and the thing in virtue of which that same claim is normative. The 
proposition recreational slaughter of persons is wrong may be true in virtue of its constitutive 
concepts, but that need not be why it is normative. It is normative, we might plausibly argue, in 
virtue of the unjustified harms that it causes. This distinction, between something’s being true 
and its being normative, helps to explain the odd sound of simultaneously judging that X is 
wrong and that it is normatively insignificant that X is wrong. 
§3 Are normative and metaethics normatively unrelated? 
Based on my replies to Killoren, Erdur, and Korsgaard, one might suspect that I want to 
isolate metaethical theorizing from normative theorizing entirely. Moreover, it might seem that I 
think that anti-moral realism itself necessarily involves a confusion. But this is not the case. In 
my view, metaethical theories are just as susceptible to normative (including moral) evaluation as 
other kinds of philosophical theories. Consider the example of theism in the philosophy of 
religion. Theism is not a substantive moral theory, or a moral theory of any kind, but this does 
not make theism immune from normative or moral critique. Recently, in fact, philosophers have 
devoted considerable attention to questions about whether (and in what ways) it would be good 
or bad if theism were true.84 We can easily explore these questions without conflating normative 
ethics and philosophy of religion; the fact that we can wonder whether or not God’s existence 
would be good does not mean that theism is a normative theory. 
																																																								
84 See especially the volume edited by Kraay (2018). 
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 Although these questions are seldom pursued, we can ask the same sorts of normative or 
evaluative questions about metaethics, without needing to think that metaethics is really just 
normative ethics in disguise. We can ask questions like, “Would it be better if moral realism 
rather than antirealism were true?”, or “Would it really be so bad if nihilism were true?”85, or any 
number of other similar normative questions about metaethics. 
 So, my complaint about eliding the distinction between normative and metaethics is a 
complaint about equating the two domains, but not about relating them at all. Questions about 
the normative or evaluative upshot of different metaethical theories are important and 
interesting questions that philosophers should devote more attention to, even if the arguments 
due to Killoren, Erdur, and Korsgaard somewhat miss the mark. 
§4 Conclusion 
I have addressed several arguments for preferring anti-realism to realism. One argument 
has to do with what realism says about morality itself. According to this argument (an in-
principle objection), morality itself would be worse if moral realism were true. Another has to do 
with the badness of endorsing realism (an in-practice objection). According to this second 
argument, the realist is necessarily committed to wrongly conditionalizing first-order moral 
judgments on metaethical posits. I have shown that these arguments exhibit a shared structure 
and underlying concern about the normative insignificance of realist metaphysics, one that 
resembles a concern that was expressed in general form by Christine Korsgaard (1996). Finally, I 
have argued that the underlying concern can be answered by keeping in view the distinction 
between normative and metaethics. In so doing, I have not argued one way or the other about 
																																																								
85 Guy Kahane recently asks this question in his, “If Nothing Matters.” I ask both questions in Chapter 3. 
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whether it really is good or bad if moral realism or anti-realism is true. That is a task for other 










Philosophers sometimes argue that certain views entail bad consequences. For example, Derek 
Parfit argued that subjectivism about reasons entails that nothing matters.86 Robert Adams 
argued that modal realism would justify moral indifference.87 Several philosophers and non-
philosophers alike argue that atheism entails that life is meaningless. Intuitively, these arguments 
have little to do with what is actually true about reasons or modality or God and speak, at most, 
to what we should want or hope for. We resist the inference from badness to falsity (or from 
goodness to truth) in these cases for the same reason that we resist it anywhere else:  it seems to 
be a bad inference. Call this seemingly bad kind of inference a “value-truth inference.” By this I 
mean an inference from the evaluative upshot of p (whether p would be good or bad) to the 
semantic properties of p (whether p is true or false). In this chapter I cast some doubt on the 
traditional reasons for rejecting value-truth inferences and defend a positive account according 
to which value judgments in some contexts of inquiry may provide some evidence of truth. In 
brief, the contexts of inquiry in which value can be evidence of truth are those in which theorists 
are at least partly responsible for accommodating the distinctively evaluative features of the 
objects of their inquiry. Finally, I argue that my framework is superior (both in its generality and 
																																																								
86 Parfit (2011). 
 
87 Adams (1979). 
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relative simplicity) to some recent approaches to this and related questions developed in 
normative theory. 
§1 Traditional objections rejected 
 There are a number of attractive explanations for why value-truth inferences seem 
inappropriate. One substantive reason has both an empirical and logical gloss. The empirical 
gloss is just that there are many horrible truths––for example, that many human beings lack 
adequate food, or that wars occur. The logical gloss is that there is no logical incompatibility 
between something’s being both horrible and true.88 Consider that we do not generally think that 
something is true despite its being horrible; we just think that something can be both true and 
horrible. Put simply, the mere fact that something would be better seems like the wrong kind of 
reason for believing that it is true. That something would be better is evidence of goodness, but 
not of truth. 
 Though attractive, these reasons are not sufficient to defeat value-truth inferences. Both 
the nature of value-truth inferences, as well as the reasons that supposedly contravene them, are 
underspecified. To illustrate, consider the following informal inference: A loving God is better 
than an unloving God, so God is loving. On the surface, this is a value-truth inference in the 
relevant sense. The premise, A loving God is better than an unloving God, is a judgment of 
comparative value, and the conclusion, God is loving, is a judgment of non-evaluative truth. 
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to reject this inference on the grounds of the considerations stated 
previously, for it is pretty clearly enthymematic.  Here is a charitable interpretation of the whole 
inference: 
																																																								
88 Cf. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen on rejecting value-truth inferences in discussions of inviolable rights: “Someone 




[A1]  God is the greatest possible being. 
[A2]  A loving God is better than an unloving God. 
 Therefore, 
[C1] God is loving. 
 
A1 says something specific about God in virtue of which value judgments about God have 
implications for the truth about what God is like. Filling out the argument in this way, do we still 
have a value-truth inference, in the sense this paper opened with? If we do, then we have an 
example that is in tension with the considerations cited above in opposition to such inferences. 
In the case of God’s nature, it seems that there is an incompatibility (or at least a tension) 
between something’s being both horrible and true. Likewise, something’s being better––again, at 
least in the case of God’s nature––does not seem like the “wrong kind of reason” for believing 
that it is true. 
 One possible way of distinguishing between the God case and problematic value-truth 
inferences is to mark out the latter as distinctively lacking the sort of linking premises available in 
the God case. Perhaps the God case has what we might call a “linking premise,” that is, a premise 
that, by fiat, simply makes value relevant to truth. To see the point, consider hilarity-truth 
inferences, which are inferences from something’s being hilarious to its being true. When we 
reflect abstractly, these seem like bad inferences. After all, there are plenty of unfunny truths, and 
there does not seem to be any logical incompatibility between something’s being both unfunny 
and true. Put simply, that something would be hilarious seems like the wrong kind of reason for 
believing that it is true. But now imagine that someone offers the following counterexample in 
defense of hilarity-truth inferences: 
[A3]  God is the most hilarious being. 
[A4]  A loving God is more hilarious than an unloving God. 
Therefore, 




Like A1, A3, by a kind of fiat, neutralizes the problem with inferring from a seemingly truth-
irrelevant property to truth, by linking the two together. 
 Perhaps the genuinely problematic examples of value-truth inferences are just those 
inferences from value to truth that lack property-truth linking premises like A1 and A3. But now, 
one begins to lose a sense of both the interest of the inferences in question, as well as the non-
triviality of the objections to them. After all, it seems that for any object, x, and any logically and 
metaphysically independent substantive properties, F and G, the mere fact that x is more G if it is 
also F is not a reason to think that x is F. In other words, inferences patterned after the following 
schema are generally invalid without linking premises: 
[A5]  If x is F, then x is more G than if x is not F. 
Therefore, 
[C3] x is F. 
 
This inference requires an additional premise of the following form: 
[A6]  x is maximally G. 
Notice that there need not be anything essentially normative or evaluative about G (or F) for this 
kind of inference to require supplementation. At most, what is needed is that G admits of 
degrees, such that it is intelligible to say that X is more or less, or minimally or maximally, G. 
 The arguments and observations of this section put considerable pressure on the idea that 
value-truth inferences run afoul of the existence of horrible truths, or that a value judgment 
provides the wrong kind of reason for a judgment of truth. In fact, the attribution of any 
property, by itself, in the context of the argument schema above, provides the wrong kind of 
reason for a truth judgment––without additional linking premises. So, the pertinent question 
about value-truth inferences seems to be whether (and if so, where) there are plausible value-
truth linking premises that can both validate them and explain their (occasional) intuitive appeal. 
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§2 Some exotic value-truth linking premises 
 The substantive debate about value-truth inferences ought to be about which value-truth 
linking premises are independently plausible. In the case of God, the overwhelming judgment of 
philosophers who have written on these matters is that A1 (that God is the greatest possible being) 
is much more plausible than something like A3 (that God is the most hilarious being). I suspect 
that what makes philosophers suspicious of value-truth inferences in general is the thought that, 
as far as both general empirical and metaphysical matters are concerned, there are typically no 
plausible linking premises on offer. 
 Leaving God to one side, we can emphasize both main points––that value judgments are 
not the wrong kinds of reasons per se, and that the proper ground of suspicion lies elsewhere––by 
mentioning two other perspectives that, if they are true, make many value-truth inferences more 
plausible. Consider axiarchism. Axiarchism is a kind of Platonism, defended especially by John 
Leslie, according to which the world exists because and for the sake of goodness.89 The good is 
both the world’s cause and its purpose––that is, the world both derives from and aims at the 
good. Thomas Nagel sketches a version of this view in Mind and Cosmos.90 According to Nagel, 
value (along with mind) is a fundamental constituent of the cosmos and something that cosmic 
history, in some sense, aims to produce. If you accept either of these frameworks or something 
similar, then the fact that some state of affairs is good, or would be better than some other state of 
affairs, may provide some reason to think that that state of affairs either has or will come about. 
																																																								
89 John Leslie (1979). See also Derek Parfit (2004). See Tim Mulgan (2017) for discussion of this family of views. 
 
90 Thomas Nagel (2012). 
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 Second, consider the less metaphysical (but no less bold) moral faith illustrated by the 
famous declaration, “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”91 One 
might take this attitude toward history without being an axiarchist like Leslie, Parfit, or Nagel. 
From this point of view, the fact that some state of affairs, say, a more just society, would be 
better, is in fact a reason to believe that it will come about (and, hence, is available as a reason for 
action).92 
 These perspectives––axiarchism, on the one hand, and a kind of moral or political faith, 
on the other––are quite radical, and most philosophers are bound to find them implausible. But 
perspectives such as these are nevertheless candidates for providing the kind of background 
information that could validate inferences from value to truth. These theories can provide value-
truth linking premises that license inferences from value judgments to truth judgments. In the 
next section, I will offer a theory about what can (much more plausibly) provide value-truth 
linking premises, using metaethics as my example domain. The chief advantage of my account 
over the two perspectives addressed in this section is that I need not posit anything 




91 The exact quote was made famous in a speech by Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1964, but it originates from Theodore 
Parker, “Of Justice and Conscience,” in Ten Sermons of Religion (Boston: Crosby Nichols and Company, 1853). In 
Parker’s words, “Look at the facts of the world. You see a continual and progressive triumph of the right. I do not 
pretend to understand the moral universe, the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways. I cannot calculate the 
curve and complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by conscience. But from what I see I am sure 
it bends toward justice” (pp. 84-85). See also Preston-Roedder, “Faith in Humanity,” for a related account of faith, 
particularly in persons. 
 
92 There is an interesting connection here to the literature on moral explanations. If, for example, Sayre-McCord and 
Sturgeon are right that moral facts can help to explain events that have happened, then there is no immediately 




§3 Value as a guide to truth in metaethics 
 Let us turn now to the case of metaethics, a domain in which some philosophers make 
strong value judgments about what would be better (see the reference to Parfit at the beginning 
of this paper), but generally do not think such judgments are relevant to truth. As Kate Manne 
suggests of her own internalist view of reasons, some metaethical theses may be “sad but true.”93 
If I am right in my account of what value-truth inferences are, and why it is that philosophers are 
skeptical about them, then the right question to ask is not whether it is appropriate to infer a 
putative metaethical truth from its being good, but whether there are any plausible linking 
premises that will allow us to move from value judgments about morality to the correct account 
of morality. 
 To begin, here is an example of a zealous value-truth inference in metaethics: 
[A7]  Moral norms are maximally authoritative. 
[A8] Moral norms are more authoritative if they are objective than if they are subjective. 
Therefore, 
[C4]  Moral norms are objective. 
 
Both A7 and A8 are controversial, but the argument from A7-C4 exhibits the right structure for 
inferences from value judgments about ways morality might be, to truth judgments about the 
way that morality is. Here is another zealous argument: 
[A9] The moral domain is maximally worth caring about. 
[A10]  A moral domain, construed realistically, is more worth caring about than the moral domain, construed 
antirealistically. 
Therefore, 
[C5]  The moral domain is realistic. 
 
Both A7-C4 and A9-C5 are zealous––but are they overzealous? They both have a particular 
species of linking premise that I will call “maximalist premises”, which strongly resemble A1 in 
																																																								
93 Kate Manne (2014). According to Manne, internalism about reasons is sad, even “gloomy”, because it precludes 
our ability to take the otherwise appealing moral stand that certain particularly evil people (who are deeply and 
consistently devoted to doing evil) have a reason to do better. 
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the earlier God case. A maximalist premise says that something has some property to the 
maximal degree. In the case of morality, such premises call to mind doctrines about the 
overriding authority of moral demands. I happen to think that some kind of overridingness 
thesis is true, if out of fashion. But in recognition of the contemporary unpopularity of the thesis, 
it is useful to know if there are inferences in the neighborhood that do not make use of 
controversial maximalist premises. 
It seems to me that maximalist premises are especially useful for deductive value-truth 
inferences. They are a handy way to get from a comparative claim (that some way of being is 
better than another) to an absolute claim (that something really is the better way). After all, 
anything less specific would be too underdetermined. That the moral domain is worth caring 
about, or even very worth caring about, does not, even in conjunction with A10, tell us anything 
about whether realism or antirealism is true. That is because, as far as anything our replacement 
premise plus A10 says, we have no idea to what degree morality is worth caring about, either in 
itself or according to various metaethical views. For all the replacement premises say, moral 
realism might make morality too worth caring about!94 
Fortunately, value-truth inferences need not be deductive. We may also make inductive 
or abductive value-truth inferences, which are inferences from something’s being better a certain 
way to its probably being that way, or best explained as being that way. Or, even more weakly, we 
may infer from something’s being better a certain way to its being, just to that extent, probably 




94 This kind of worry would resemble so-called “demandingness objections” in normative moral theory. 
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[A11]  Morality is very worth caring about. 
[A12] Moral realism better explains A15 than moral antirealism. 
Therefore, 
[C6]  Moral realism is more probable than antirealism in at least one respect. 
 
A11-C6 is a value-truth inference, because it involves moving from a value judgment (A11, that 
morality is very worth caring about) to a truth judgment (C6, that moral realism is more 
probable than antirealism in at least one respect). I regard C6 as a truth judgment in the relevant 
sense, because probability is being used in a purely alethic way. (A judgment can be normative 
without being evaluative, in the sense relevant here.) To say that moral realism is made more 
probable than anti-realism by some phenomenon is to say that, at least with respect to that 
phenomenon, it is more likely that moral realism is true. 
 Unfortunately for the iconoclastic defender of value-truth inferences per se, but 
fortunately for the somewhat deflationary purposes of this paper, our best candidates for such 
inferences begin to look suspiciously like more ordinary inferences made in metaethical––and 
every other kind of––descriptive theorizing. All A11-C6 is really saying is that morality has some 
property, F, and that moral realism better accommodates F than moral antirealism. But this is 
just an ordinary way of conducting philosophical theorizing in general. Compare: many 
philosophers have argued that moral realism better accommodates the surface-level grammar of 
moral sentences than moral antirealism, and so this property speaks in favor of the truth of 
realism. The surface-level grammar of moral sentences does not seem like an evaluative property 
of morality, yet arguments for moral realism on their basis seem structurally identical to A11-C6. 
In metaethical value-truth inferences, it just so happens that the property is evaluative in nature. 
 Is there anything special, then, about value-truth inferences in general, or in the 
particular moral case? I submit that there is nothing special about these inferences, and 
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consequently that there should also be nothing, on reflection, suspicious about them. The reason 
why value-truth inferences are attractive and appropriate in the metaethical case, as in the 
theological case discussed in the previous section, is simply because theorists in these domains 
are responsible for accommodating both evaluative and non-evaluative aspects of the target 
phenomenon. In some of the most paradigmatic domains of rational inquiry, e.g., all domains of 
natural science, theorists are responsible for accommodating only non-evaluative phenomena. 
Physicists, for instance, must accommodate what we know from other natural sciences, what we 
observe in the laboratory, various theoretical desiderata, and so on, but they need not 
accommodate distinctly evaluative phenomena like the fact that persons are valuable, or that the 
world is valuable, or even that physics itself is valuable. Likewise, evolutionary biologists, even 
though they have plenty to explain about the nature of life, are not responsible for 
accommodating evaluative facts, for example, that it is wrong to end a life for no reason. 
 In the cases of both theology and moral theory, the objects of theorizing (God and 
morality, respectively) have evaluative properties that we ordinarily want theorists to 
accommodate. A good theologian not only accounts for, say, God’s having created the world, but 
also accounts for God’s goodness. If a theology fails to fully accommodate God’s goodness, then 
that is a theoretical cost for the theory––not merely the positing of a horrible truth, though it 
may also be that. Likewise, a good metaethicist does not only account for, say, the surface-level 
grammar of moral sentences, but also for morality’s importance or value. If a metaethical theory 
fails to fully accommodate morality’s importance, then that is a theoretical cost for the theory––
not merely the positing of a horrible truth, though it may also be that. 
 The examples of metaethics and theology are sufficient to show that what validates value-
truth inferences has to do with the responsibilities bestowed on theory-builders by their 
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respective domains. But it is worth wondering whether there are cases other than metaethics and 
theology where philosophical theorizing is beholden to evaluative aspects of the target 
phenomenon.95 There are. For example, insofar as knowledge is thought to be valuable or worth 
having, accounts of knowledge are responsible for accommodating this fact.96 There are other 
cases of philosophical theorizing that less obviously resemble value-truth inferences, but which 
have exactly the motivations laid out here. For example, in his influential paper, “Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry Frankfurt seems to presuppose that theories of 
personhood are better if their truth means that personhood is itself better. He writes, 
In those senses of [“person”] which are of greater philosophical interest, … the criteria for being a person 
do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. 
Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern 
with ourselves and the source of what we regard as the most important and most problematical in our 
lives.97 
 
At the end of the paper, Frankfurt claims theoretical victory for his account of freedom of the will 
partly by claiming that his account “satisfies another condition that must be met by any such 
theory,” viz., that “freedom of the will should be regarded as desirable.”98 It is not clear why it 
should count against a theory of freedom that freedom comes out as being not as desirable as we 
																																																								
95 Some philosophers with whom I have discussed these ideas suggest that, contrary to what I have said so far, the 
natural sciences do involve accommodating evaluative features of the domain, because theoretical desiderata 
(mentioned above) are normative. This misses my point, but in an illuminating way: theoretical desiderata are not 
features of the target domain of inquiry. Simplicity, for example, is thought by many to be a property of good theories 
and might be, in that sense, normative for theorizing itself. But simplicity is not presumed in advance to be a 
property of, say, biological organisms or planets––certainly not in any normative way. Of course, theorists working 
on the nature of theorizing itself are partly responsible for accommodating the evaluative aspects of the theoretical 
virtues. But theorizing is a very different kind of domain from the domains of the natural sciences themselves. 
 
96 Consider Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature, which connects knowledge to the importance of 
having good informants about the world. Craig’s theory gains a theoretical advantage insofar as it accommodates 
what is valuable about knowledge. A theory that renders knowledge valueless is not for that reason necessarily false, 
but it can for that reason only be true at a cost. 
 
97 Frankfurt (1971, 6). 
 
98 Frankfurt (1971, 17). 
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thought it was, unless we take theorists in this domain to be responsible for accommodating 
certain evaluative as well as non-evaluative aspects of freedom itself. 
 Before showing the advantages of my account over its rivals, let me recap what has been 
established. First, the traditional reasons for rejecting value-truth inferences, though intuitively 
attractive, are not very good. Once we see why they are not very good, we can also see that what 
bothers us about value-truth inferences could be a problem with any other kind of property, 
evaluative or not: the absence of a property-truth linking premise. Finally, one need not resort to 
metaphysical esoterica like axiarchism in order to vindicate value-truth inferences. Rather, I have 
defended a self-consciously boring account: value judgments can provide some defeasible 
evidence for the truth of a theory about some domain just when theorists of that domain are 
responsible for accommodating certain of its evaluative features. The proposal is boring, because 
there is nothing special about evaluative features as far as inferences to truth are concerned. In 
principle, the point applies to any other kind of feature. If theorists were responsible for 
accommodating the comedic features of a domain, then the fact that some theory secures more 
hilarity than another would be some defeasible evidence for that theory. 
§4 Comparative advantages of the view 
 Due to their appeal in first-order moral theorizing, the recent literature on value-truth 
inferences focuses somewhat narrowly on moral philosophy. Generally speaking, extant theories 
either suffer from being applicable only to moral theory, or are needlessly complicated or esoteric 
(much like axiarchism). The point in this section is decidedly not that there is nothing true or 
insightful in the approaches discussed in what follows: in fact, I think that each of them shows us 
something important about morality and normativity. Rather, whatever these theories have to 
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say, I aim to show that they are not needed for the specific purpose of defending value-truth 
inferences. 
4.1 Nagel’s “curious type of argument” 
 First, a word on how the contemporary literature got started. Thomas Nagel is largely 
responsible for the recent literature on value-truth inferences as they appear in normative moral 
theory, though he primarily notes the appeal of such inferences in moral theory rather than 
attempts to explain them. In “Personal Rights and Public Space,” Nagel defends and employs a 
broadly deontological approach to human rights, according to which rights are intrinsic to 
persons rather than instrumental. Nagel argues that, because it is better if we have these rights, 
we––therefore––do in fact have them. In his words, 
The argument is that the most plausible alternative morality, which is based solely on the agent-neutral 
value or disvalue of the actual enjoyment or infringement of certain freedoms, and so on, fails to give any 
place to another very important value––the intrinsic value of inviolability itself. The argument is that we 
would all be worse off if there were no rights––even if we suffered the transgressions which in that case 
would not count as violations of our rights––ergo, there are rights.99 
 
Nagel reflects on this “curious type of argument,” conceding that its form is not “in general a 
cogent form of argument.”100 Yet, even if the argument form is invalid outside of moral theory, 
“It may be suitable to argue that one morality is more likely to be true than another, because the 
former makes for a better world than the latter––not instrumentally, but intrinsically.”101 
 When Nagel writes that one morality might make for “a better world” than another, it 
typically seems that he means “better” in a collective agent-relative sense, i.e., better for us.102 A 
																																																								






102 Lippert-Rasmussen reads Nagel as running together two kinds of argument, one involving “the value-for-us” and 
the other “the value-of-outcome” (135). 
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morality that includes intrinsic rights is better for us, because it is better to have intrinsic rights 
than instrumental rights. Intrinsic rights themselves are better, because the kind of inviolability 
constitutive of intrinsic rights is better than the normatively possible violability constitutive of 
rights instrumentally construed. 
 As I mentioned, Nagel does not try to explain any of this. But my framework easily 
accommodates the value-truth inference regarding personal rights. Rights (and persons) have 
certain evaluative features, including that they appear extremely valuable to have (and to be). We 
could be wrong about this; perhaps the best theory of rights, all things considered, involves 
making some sacrifices with respect to the status of personhood––this would be a regrettable 
truth. But even if so, if a theory of rights that accommodates inviolability is a theory that makes 
persons and their rights more valuable, then, to that extent, it is more theoretically plausible than 
its rivals. Instrumentalist theories of rights, if true, would be true in spite of the theoretical cost 
they incur by rejecting inviolability. So there is, on reflection, nothing mysterious about the 
appeal of Nagel’s value-truth inference. It is simply indicative of the fact that normative moral 
theorists are responsible for accommodating not only non-evaluative aspects of morality, but 
evaluative aspects as well. 
 Strictly speaking, my account is not a proper rival to Nagel’s, because, as I said, Nagel 
does not really offer an account; he merely offers the apparent plausibility of the inference, 
leaving the account as basically mysterious. 
4.2 David Enoch 
 In his short paper, “Wouldn’t it Be Nice if p, Therefore, p (for a moral p),” David Enoch 
attempts a very different sort of vindication of Nagel’s inference. Enoch begins his defense of 
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Nagel with the observation that, for at least one logical operator, It is possible that, the following 
form of inference is valid: 
◊◊p→◊p  
If it is possible that it is possible that p, then it is possible that p. Enoch observes that for other 
operators, for example, I desire that, the inference rule does not work. I may desire that I desire 
something and yet not desire it (in other words, second-order desires do not entail first-order 
desires). Now consider the moral operator, It is good that. Suppose we are wondering whether it 
is good that the world exists, and we could (for some odd reason) directly establish only that it 
would be good if it were good that the world exists. Enoch thinks that it may follow from this that 
it is, in fact, good that the world exists. Here is how Enoch applies his suggestion to Nagel’s 
article: 
If … the debate over our dignified status can be understood as a debate over something of the form it is 
good that q (for some q), then the inferential move from it would be good if we had a non-consequentialist 
dignified status to we have such a status could be vindicated as an instance of GGq → Gq.103 
 
But it is not at all clear how the proposition that we have a non-consequentialist dignified status is 
equivalent in the right ways to it is good that q, for some q. Enoch has only shown that, for some 
operators, if the conclusion of a property-truth inference is itself a proposition falling under the 
operator, then inferences of the relevant form may go through. But, in the moral case, these are 
really value-value inferences, not value-truth inferences. So, it is not clear to me that Enoch has 
even so much as suggested a way of vindicating Nagel’s inference, the conclusion of which is not 




103 David Enoch (200, 223). 
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4.3 Rob Van Someren Greve 
 In “Wishful Thinking in Moral Theorizing: Comment on Enoch,” Rob Van Someren 
Greve criticizes Enoch’s argument for a different reason. Assume both that “it would be good if 
the actual world were better than it is”, and that a better world “contains more valuable states of 
affairs than any world that is less good.”104 Van Someren Greve thinks that this means that “the 
higher the number of good states of affairs that the actual world contains, the better this world 
is.”105 If this is right, then he says that, for any state of affairs that the world contains, it is good if 
that state of affairs is good. After all, the more good states of affairs there are, the more good the 
world as a whole is. But if Enoch is right about the operator, It is good that, then he is committed 
to every state of affairs being good, and consequently, he is committed to the world being as good 
as it can be, given the states of affairs it contains. 
 I happen to disagree with the contention that, for any state of affairs, it is good if that state 
of affairs is good. Elsewhere, I defend the idea that it is good, not only that some things are good, 
but that it is good that some things are bad.106 A world in which, for example, betrayal is morally 
indifferent is worse than a world in which betrayal is bad. I take this to be the intuitive force 
behind an objection to a crude form of Divine Command Theory, according to which moral 
obligations are whatever God contingently commands. The objection is that, if the crude Divine 
Command Theory is true, then God could command various horrible things, and such 
commands would make those things good. Apart from the thought that various horrible things 
could not be good, it seems like it would be bad if they were. A crude Divine Command Theory 
																																																								




106 See Chapter 3, in particular the section on the badness of moral nihilism. 
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paints a morally ugly picture of what moral obligations are like. So, although I think Enoch’s 
argument is a non-sequitur with respect to Nagel’s point, I nevertheless reject the inferences Van 
Someren Greve makes from his assumptions about states of affairs to the premises in his reductio 
against Enoch. 
4.4 Ryan Preston-Roedder 
 In his paper, “A Better World,” Ryan Preston-Roedder defends what he calls the “better 
world argument.” This argument “rests on the view that morality cannot undermine the aims 
that it assigns us, together with the view that morality assigns us the aim of bringing about a 
better world.”107 If those two claims are right, and it turns out that the truth of some moral theory 
T1 would make for a worse world than the truth of some other moral theory, T2, then it seems 
that there is a valid value-truth inference available in favor of the truth of T2. 
 If Preston-Roedder is right, then statements of the form, “Regrettably, p,” carry with them 
some tension for any p that involves a specific kind of normative moral content. Supposing that it 
is true that morality, construed realistically, is better than morality, construed antirealistically, 
then there is at least a sense in which the truth of a metaethical theory might undermine the aims 
that morality assigns to us. However, this would not obviously mean that a moral theory is 
subject to the kind of self-defeat Preston-Roedder envisages. Preston-Roedder is thinking of 
moral theories that contain certain substantive principles, like the principle that we should act 
always to maximize the good, that in themselves make for a worse world and thus defeat one of 
our moral aims––despite the fact that the very same moral theory (in virtue of being a moral 
theory) demands that we have this aim. And the fact that a moral theory makes a demand that is 
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such that it––just in being a demand––undermines one of our moral aims, is itself a reason to 
reject that theory.  
Metaethical theories like moral realism do not contain substantive principles in this sense, 
though they may contain accounts of moral phenomena that undermine the aim of making the 
world better. For example, contrast a realist and a subjectivist reading of what it is for a victim of 
a wrong to have a claim against a wrongdoer. A realist account of what this means, for example, 
that the victim is vindicated in a third-personal manner by the external, response-independent 
system of moral truths, seems to make for a better state of affairs than a simple subjectivist 
account. If this is true, then adopting a subjectivist position in metaethics might undermine one 
of our moral aims in a way that moral realism does not. But it would not be a kind of self-defeat, 
since the metaethical theories themselves do not make substantive demands. 
Ultimately, I think that Preston-Roedder’s account of how a moral theory might be self-
defeating with respect to one of our substantive moral aims is less plausible than the considerably 
less exotic suggestion that moral theorists––both normative and metaethical––are responsible for 
accommodating, among other things, the evaluative aspects of morality. Taking one of Preston-
Roedder’s primary examples, it does seem like a crude consequentialist principle that makes no 
allowances for non-moral value, special obligations to family and friends, meaningful personal 
projects, and the like, “would deprive us of a desirable form of autonomy that we would have if 
we were often permitted to promote our private aims.”108 But we can recast this point as one 
about the value of our autonomy, which is something that any moral theorist should strive to 
accommodate. The better a moral theory accommodates autonomy and its value, the more 
plausible it is in that respect. If our autonomy just means our freedom to select what the crude 
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consequentialist principle dictates, then it is not as valuable as we pre-theoretically take it to be. 
The consequentialist principle is accordingly less plausible. 
The same goes for the kind of independent vindication against wrongdoing I appealed to 
in contrasting realism with subjectivism. To have the moral verdict in your favor is something 
that we take to be extremely valuable. If moral verdicts turn out, on a metaethical theory, to be 
not particularly desirable, then this is a theoretical cost to that theory, albeit not a decisive one. 
4.5 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord 
 Finally, in his widely circulated manuscript, “On the Distinction Between a Better Moral 
Theory and a Theory of a Better Morality,” Geoffrey Sayre-McCord argues that, if we discover 
that our best theory of morality does not align with our theory of the best morality, then this 
discovery counts against what we thought was our best theory.109 His basic idea is that, when 
value-truth inferences work, they work in virtue of the fact that the “standards of morality” must 
“justifiably mak[e] a claim on our allegiance.”110 Ultimately, Sayre-McCord thinks that the point 
generalizes to all normative concepts. “[C]ompetence with our normative concepts, which 
purport to establish reasons, commits us to seeing arguments that they do not as a challenge to 
our understanding of the concepts in question.”111 In another paper, Sayre-McCord applies these 
claims to the case of moral dilemmas, arguing that any moral theory that allows for moral 
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dilemmas describes a worse morality (all else equal) than a moral theory that would preclude 
them, and this is itself a reason to reject the former.112 
 How might this approach apply to the metaethical case (restricting again to metaethical 
moral theory)? Suppose, with Sayre-McCord, that the standards of morality demand our 
allegiance. If it is better that those demands be realistic rather than antirealistic, then perhaps 
moral demands, realistically construed, deserve our allegiance more than moral demands, 
antirealistically construed. We might recast this as the claim that moral realism better 
accommodates the authority of morality, where being authoritative is understood to be an 
evaluative feature of morality itself. 
Something about the metaethical application of Sayre-McCord’s framework seems fishier 
than the normative application. To see the problem, consider again a metaethical Divine 
Command Theory on which God’s commands are necessarily identical to our moral obligations. 
Perhaps, moral demands that constitute divine commands deserve our allegiance even more than 
moral demands that do not, in virtue of their being moral demands plus commands of God. But 
this would be a very odd reason to suppose that moral demands are, in fact, divine commands. If 
this were an appropriate inference, then we could infer from the fact that divinely commanded 
norms are morally better than non-divinely commanded norms, the even more ambitious 
conclusion that God exists––since the existence of divine commands entails the existence of God. 
 The only way that such an inference might go through is if we are using the framework I 
have suggested above, according to which metaethical theorizing must accommodate the 
evaluative features of morality. If we grant in advance that moral norms are authoritative in a 
certain way (perhaps, that they demand our allegiance), and it turns out that one metaethical 
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theory best accommodates this fact, then that works in favor of the metaethical theory. But again, 
this is an ordinary kind of theoretical success––it does not speak to the special nature of 
normative concepts. To reiterate, none of this means that Sayre-McCord’s account is not 
insightful or illuminating; it is just not necessary for the particular explanatory purpose of 
vindicating value-truth inferences. 
§5 Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have addressed an apparently puzzling fact. While inferences of the form, 
It would be good that p, therefore p, are often bad inferences, they seem to have some appeal in 
some areas of inquiry. Popular objections to the general form of inference are too quick, since 
such inferences might be licensed in a number of ways. However, once the ways of licensing such 
inferences are made clear, their successful instances are much less philosophically interesting or 
surprising than they first appear. But the principled boredom induced by my account is a feature, 
not a bug. Finally, I surveyed some recent work on these inferences in moral theory, noting how 
the work relates to and differs from what I say here. The point of the final section was not to say 
that the comparatively exotic proposals on offer have nothing to contribute to our understanding 
of morality or normativity, but that they are not necessary for explaining the appeal of value-
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